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Private Broadcasters and the Public Interest:
Notes toward a “Third Way”
Cass R. Sunstein*
I. Introduction
The so-called communications revolution has been driven by
technological change. The rise of cable television, the Internet,
satellite television, “direcTV,” and digital television has confounded
ordinary understandings of “television.”1 Before long, digital
television may enable viewers to choose among over a thousand
programs.2 The possible combination of television and the
Internet—a combination now in its early stages—may prove an
equally dramatic development.3
Law has responded to these developments in fits and starts,
largely by attempting to engraft legal requirements designed for the
old environment onto an altogether new communications market.
The result is a high degree of anachronism, misfit, and drift, and in
the view of many observers, a series of constitutional violations.4
* Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor, University of Chicago, Law
School and Department of Political Science. From 1997 to 1998, the author
served on the Advisory Committee on the Public Service Obligations of Digital
Television Broadcasters, which produced a report in December 1998. See Final
Report of the Advisory Committee on Public Interest Obligations of Digital
Television Broadcasters, Charting the Digital Broadcasting Future (1998). The
author is grateful to other members of the Advisory Committee for many helpful
discussions of these problems, and in particular to the two co-chairs of the
Committee, Norman Ornstein and Leslie Moonves. The Committee’s Final
Report has influenced the treatment here, not least when there are disagreements.
He is also grateful to Douglas Lichtman, Eric Posner, and Richard Posner for
valuable comments.
1 See Bruce Owen, The Internet Challenge to Television 311-26 (1999)
(discussing this possibility with some skepticism about its feasibility, but also
dealing with other dramatic technological developments).
2 See Lawrie Mifflin, As Band of Channels Grows, Niche Programs Will Boom,
N. Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1998, at A1.
3 See Owen, supra note 1, at 311-26.
4 See Thomas Krattenmaker and L.A. Powe, Converging First Amendment
Principles for Converging Communications Media, 104 Yale L.J. 1719, 1725
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Most of the modern debate involves a vigorous but increasingly tired
contest between those defending the old regulatory order 5 and those
urging rapid movement toward “simple rules” for government
control of television, above all well-defined property rights and
freedom of contract.6
My aim in this Article is to discuss a small but important part of
the intersection between the emerging communications market and
law: public interest obligations imposed on television broadcasters.
Since the initial rise of broadcasting in the United States,
government has treated the license as a kind of “grant” that is
legitimately accompanied by duties.7 Congress and the FCC have
required broadcasters to follow a range of requirements—a form of
old-style “command-and-control” regulation, growing out of an
understanding that there would be three, and only three, private
broadcasting stations. Much, though far from all, of this regulation
was eliminated in the 1980s.8 A large question is the extent to which
public interest requirements continue to make sense, or even to
survive constitutional scrutiny, in an entirely different
communications market.
The question was posed starkly with the enactment of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996,9 one of whose central concerns
involved the rise of digital television. The Act had to deal with two
issues. First, who would have the right to broadcast digital television?
(1995); Mark Fowler and Daniel Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast
Regulation, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 207, 210 (1982); the various contributions to
Rationales and Rationalizations: Regulating the Electronic Media (Richard CornRevere ed. 1997).
5 This is the general thrust of Lee C. Bollinger, Images of a Free Press (1991);
Owen M. Fiss, The Irony of Free Speech (1996).
6 See Rationales and Rationalizations, supra (offering a number of essays
challenging any role for governmnent aside from the definition and enforcement of
property rights); Richard A. Epstein, Simple Rules for a Complex World 275-306
(1996) (discussing environmental protection, and a general account of the role of
government, in a way that is easily adapted to the area of communications).
7 See below.
8 See below.
9 The Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56
(codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-613 and amending the
Communications Act of 1934).
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Should the licenses be sold, or auctioned, or given outright to
existing broadcasters? Second, what public interest obligations—if
any—should attach to the ownership of a right to broadcast digital
television? The Act squarely answered the first question but was
silent on the second. 10 In an extremely controversial step, Congress
did not sell or auction the right to broadcast digital television, but
basically gave the right to existing broadcasters for free.11 This has
sometimes been described as a “$70 billion giveaway.”12 At the same
time, Congress refused to eliminate public interest obligations and
delegated to the FCC the power to decide whether such obligations
should be imposed on digital television broadcasters, and if so in
what form.13 The FCC has not yet made that decision or even
commenced formal proceedings.
In this Article I offer two basic claims, one involving ends, the
other involving means. The first is that at least in the near term, the
nature of the emerging communications market does not provide a
sufficient reason to abandon the idea that broadcasters should be
required to promote public interest goals. There is a large difference
between the public interest and what interests the public. This is
especially so in light of the still-distinctive character and
consequences of the communications market. One of the central
goals of the system of broadcasting, private as well as public, should
be to promote the American aspiration to deliberative
democracy14—a system in which citizens are informed about public
10 47 U.S.C. 336(a).
11 Id.
12 See, e.g., Editorial, What Price Digital Television?, N.Y. Times, Dec. 26, 1998
at A26 (editorial). See also See Federal Management of the Radio Spectrum:
Advanced Television Services: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm. and
Fin. of the House Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong. 82 (1996) (statement of
Robert M. Pepper, Chief, Office of Plans and Policy, FCC, stating that an auction
would bring between $11 to $70 billion in revenue). For general criticism, see
Thomas Krattenmaker, The Telecommunications Act of 1996, 29 Conn. L. Rev.
123, 163-64 (1996); Matthew Spitzer, Dean Krattenmacher’s Road Not Taken, 29
Conn. L. Rev. 353 (1996).
13 47 U.S.C. 336(d).
14 See, e.g., Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and
Disagreement 52-94 (1996) (discussing reciprocity); Joshua Cohen, Democracy
and Liberty, in Deliberative Democracy 185-231(Jon Elster ed. 1998).
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issues and able to make judgments on the basis of reasons.
Educational programming, and programming that deals with civic
questions, can promote that aspiration; reliance on an unregulated
market may not. There are also legitimate grounds for encouraging
broadcasters to make programming accessible to people with
disabilities, above all the deaf. I emphasize in this connection some
special characteristics of the broadcasting market, characteristics that
make it hazardous to rely on the ideal of “consumer sovereignty” as
the exclusive basis for regulatory policy.
My second claim is that in order to promote the relevant goals,
government should decreasingly rely on command-and-control
regulation,15 and should turn instead to three less intrusive and more
flexible instruments, each of which is well-adapted to a period of
rapid technological change. The instruments are (1) mandatory
public disclosure of information about public interest broadcasting,
unaccompanied by content regulation; (2) economic incentives,
above all “play or pay”; and (3) voluntary self-regulation, as through a
“code” of appropriate conduct, to be created and operated by the
industry itself. These instruments have played an increasing role in
regulatory policy in general, especially in the environmental arena.16
But they have not been discussed in the area of communications,
where they have a natural place; and despite its growing importance,
the general topic of self-regulation by industry self-regulation has
received little academic attention.17

15 A question not addressed here is the content of any minimal requirements; I
emphasize the more flexible alternatives as the instruments of choice, without
denying the need for some minima as a “backstop.” In the current system, for
example, it may well make sense to require a degree of children’s programming and
also free air time for candidates. See Final Report, supra note *. The precise extent
of mandatory programming is beyond the scope of the present discussion, though I
do refer to mandates at several points below..
16 See generally Neil Cunningham and Peter Grabosky, Smart Regulation:
Designing Environmental Policy 422-48 (1999); Anthony Ogus, Regulation 121149, 245-56 (1998); National Academy of Public Administration, The
Environment Goes To Market 12-55 (1994).
17 The principal exception can be found in an illuminating symposium issue in an
Australian law review, see Symposium, Industry Self-Regulation, 19 Law & Policy
363 (1997).
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Through requiring broadcasters to disclose information about
their public interest activities, government may be able to enlist
public pressure and social norms so as to create a kind of competition
to do more and better. This is the simplest and least intrusive of
regulatory instruments. By allowing broadcasters to buy their way
out of certain public interest obligations, government should be able
to ensure that those with an incentive to produce good programming
are actually doing so, and also to produce lowest-cost means of
promoting public interest programming. And through encouraging
(not mandating) voluntary self-regulation, government can help
broadcasters to overcome a kind of prisoner’s dilemma faced by
participants in a “winner-take-all” market,18 a prisoner’s dilemma
that contributes to a range of social problems, often stemming from
a kind of “race to the bottom” with respect to programming quality.
It should be clear that this basic approach combines an
insistence on the serious limits of unrestrained communications
markets in promoting social goals with a plea for rejecting traditional
regulation and for enlisting more flexible, market-oriented
instruments in the service of those goals. This approach is consistent
with some incipient but quite general trends in regulatory law.19 If
the approach is sound, it is ideally suited to the emerging
communications market; but it is easily adapted to other areas as
well, involving environmental degradation and other social problems.
It is much too soon to say whether there is a “third way” between
traditional command-and-control regulation and reliance on free
trade and well-defined property rights. But if there is indeed a “third
way,” it is likely to be found in proposals of this kind.
Thus the most general theme of this Article is that disclosure,
economic incentives, and voluntary self-regulation might displace
government command-and-control in a variety of areas of regulatory
law. More specific themes involve the value of requiring producers to
18 See Robert H. Frank and Phillip J. Cook, The Winner-Take-All Society 189209 (1995).
19 See, e.g., Neil Gunningham and Peter Grabosky, Smart Regulation: Designing
Environmental Policy 37-92 (1999); National Academy of Public Administration,
The Environment Goes To Market (1994); Cass R. Sunstein, Informational
Regulation and Informational Standing,: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. Pa. L. Rev.
613, 618-33 (1999).
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disclose goods and bads, independent of any regulatory
requirements; of relaxing the antitrust laws so as to permit
cooperation designed to reduce some of problems associated with
both “winner-take-all” markets and “races to the bottom”; of
distinguishing between market-suppressing and marketsupplementing remedies; of building on emerging developments in
environmental protection so as to allow far more imaginative “trades”
among producers of social goods and bads; and of greatly expanding
the repertoire of regulatory tools to be used by officials concerned
with market failures (or market successes that disserve social goals).
In short, it is time to move beyond the view that market ordering
and content regulation are the two possibilities for communications
law. There are many alternatives, and real progress can come only
from exploring the choice among them.
The Article comes in eight parts. Part II sets the stage, outlining
the history of regulation and identifying some relevant puzzles. Part
III evaluates, and rejects, the claim that in the emerging television
market, there is no longer room for public interest regulation of any
kind. I suggest that broadcasting is no ordinary commodity, partly
because of the collective benefits of good programming, and partly
because viewers are more like products, offered to advertisers, than
consumers paying for entertainment on their own. I also trace likely
stages of the emerging market, with broadcast programming
becoming more and more like general-interest magazines. Part IV
deals with disclosure, exploring the possibility that relevant private
groups, invoking widespread social norms, can interact to produce
improvements in the broadcasting market without compulsory
programming of any kind. Part V deals with economic incentives,
beginning with the idea of “pay or play,” and then adapting some
ideas in the law of tort to the law of broadcasting. Part VI examines
whether a code of broadcasting might operate as kind of positional
arms control agreement, helping to counteract a situation in which
broadcasters compete to the detriment of collective goals. Part VII is
a brief summary of regulatory options. Part VIII provides a
conclusion.
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II. History, Puzzles, Problems

A. A Brief Historical Overview20
Broadcast licenses have never been treated like ordinary property
rights, open for sale on the free market. Since the initial enactment
of the Communications Act of 1934, the government has awarded
licenses to broadcasters in accordance with the “public interest,
convenience, and necessity.”21 The Federal Radio Commission early
described the system as one in which broadcasters “must be operated
as if owned by the public. . . . It is as if a community should own a
station and turn it over to the best man in sight with this injunction:
‘Manage this station in our interest . . . .”22 Under this “public
trustee” standard, the FCC has imposed a range of obligations on
broadcasters.
In its initial set of guidelines, the FCC required stations to meet
the “tastes, needs and desires of all substantial groups among the
listening public.”23 This required “a well-rounded program, in which
entertainment, consisting of music of both classical and lighter
grades, religion, education and instruction, important public events,
discussions of public questions, weather, market reports, and news,
and matters of interest to all members of the family, find a place.”24
Often this kind of guidance operated as a general plea, with
little systematic enforcement. In 1960, however, the FCC went so
far as to outline fourteen of the “major elements usually necessary to
the public interest.”25 These included religious programming;
program for children; political broadcasts; news programs; sports
programs; weather and market services, and development and use of
20 This section draws on the first section of the report referred to in note * supra.
21 47 USC 303®.
22 The Federal Radio Commission and the Public Service Responsibility of
Broadcast Licensees, 11 Fed. Comm. B.J. 5, 14 (1950) (quoting Schaeffer Radio
Co., an unpublished 1930 FRC decision).
23 Great Lakes Broadcasting Co. v. FRC, 3 FRC Ann. Rep. 32, 34 (1929),
modified on other grounds, 37 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir.), cert. dismissed, 281 U.S.
706 (1930).
24 Id.
25 Report and Statement of Policy Res: Commission en banc Programming
Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 2303, 2314-15 (1960).
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local talent. The FCC eventually specified its general guidelines,
which were intended merely as “indicia of the types and areas of”
appropriate service. The specifications included minimum amounts
for news, public affairs, and other non-entertainment programming,
including the controversial “fairness doctrine,” and also access rules
for prime-time.26 Broadcasters were required to limit advertising
time, maintain program logs, and ascertain local community needs.27
Substantial changes occurred in the 1980s, a period of
significant deregulation. The head of the FCC, Mark Fowler,
declared that television is “just another appliance,” a “toaster with
pictures.”28 The fairness doctrine was largely eliminated, and many
of the more particular public interest requirements were removed.29
Nonetheless, a number of such requirements remain. For example,
the FCC continues to say that if a broadcaster sells airtime to one
candidate, it must sell similar time to opposing candidates as well.
Congress itself has codified a right of this kind.30 A longstanding
statutory provision requires that if a broadcaster offers to sell time, it
must do so at the “lowest unit rate of the station” during the 45 days
before a primary election and during the 60 days before a general or
special election.31
Recent years have seen special attention to children’s
programming and to deaf people’s access to television. In 1990,

26 See In re Amendment to Section 0.281 of the Commission’s Rules:
Delegations of Authority to the Chief, Broadcast Bureau, 59 F.C.C.2d 491, 493
(1976); See Amendment of Part 73 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations
with Respect to Competition and Responsibility in Network Television
Broadcasting, Report and Order, 23 F.C.C.2d 382, 385-7 (1970).
27 See id.
28 See Bernard Nossiter, Licenses to Coin Money, 240 Nation 402 (1985).
29 In re The Revision of Programming and Commercialization Policies, 98
F.C.C. 2d 1076 (1984). See also Revision of Applications for Renewals, 49
R.R.2d 470 (1981) (postcard renewals); In re Complaint of Syracuse Peace
Council, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043, 5054-55 (1987) (repealing most of fairness doctrine),
aff'd, Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
30 47 U.S.C. § 315.
31 47 U.S.C. § 315(b).
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Congress enacted the Children’s Programming Act of 1990,32 which
requires broadcasters to provide three hours of educational
programming per week, and which also limits the advertising on
children’s programming (12 minutes per hour during weekdays and
10/5 minutes per weekends).33 A statute enacted in 1990 requires
new television sets to have special decoder chips, allowing them to
display closed captioned television transmissions.34 The
Telecommunications Act of 1996 requires use of “v-chip”
technology, designed to facilitate parental control over what enters
the home; it also contains ancillary requirements intended to ensure
“ratings” of programming content.35
B. Two Puzzles
Turn now to the present, or at least to the recent past. From 1997
to 1998, a presidential advisory committee met to discuss the public
interest obligation of television broadcasters.36 Several of the
broadcasters on the Committee were quite skeptical about
governmental mandates, but highly receptive to the idea of adopting
some kind of broadcasting “code,” akin to the kind approved and
administered by the National Association of Broadcasters between
1928 and 1979. The Committee eventually moved toward endorsing
the notion of a code, and the idea received considerable attention,
mid-deliberations, in the trade press.
In its annual meeting, however, the National Association of
Broadcasters signaled its skepticism about the idea and came very
close to saying “no” and “never.” Very oddly, a large part of the
broadcasters’ objection was that any “code” would violate the
antitrust laws. This is very odd, because in their discussions,
members of the NAB treated the possibility of an antitrust violation
as extremely good news. It is not often that high-level corporate
32 Children's Television Act of 1990, tits. I, II, §§ 103, 203, 47 U.S.C. §§
303(a)-(b), 394 (1994).
33 Pub. L. No. 101-437, § 102(b).
34 Television Decoder Circuitry Act of 1990, 47 U.S.C. § 303(u).
35 See the general discussion in James Hamilton, supra note, at 302-11.
36 I draw on personal recollections here. See note * supra. Transcripts of the
relevant meetings can be found at the website of the Advisory Committee on the
Public Interest Obligations of Digital Television Broadcasters.
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officials are smiling when they discuss the possibility that certain
action would be found unlawful.
Consider a second puzzle. During the committee’s deliberations,
some people argued on behalf of a “pay or play” system, in which
broadcasters would be relieved of public interest obligations (to
“pay”) if they agree instead to pay someone else—another
broadcaster—to do so. But many of the broadcasters on the
committee were quite skeptical of this approach, arguing that public
interest obligations were part of the duty of every broadcaster, and
that no one should be exempted for a price. This was also very odd.
It is not often that high-level corporate officials prefer rigid
government mandates to more flexible approaches. What explains
these puzzles?
C. Identifying the Problem
To evaluate particular proposals, it is necessary to have a
concrete sense of why some people think that even well-functioning
television markets are inadequate. Consider the following
possibilities, each of which has produced public concern in the last
decade37:
1. There may be insufficient educational programming for
children. The existing fare may be insufficient because there is
too little simply in terms of amount, or because children do not
watch the stations on which it is available, or because the
quality is too low.
2. Some programming may be affirmatively bad for children if,
for example, it contains excessive violence, or otherwise
encourages behavior that is dangerous to self and others. The
result of such programming may be to produce violent or
otherwise dangerous behavior in the real world.38
37 For different angles, see, e.g., Final Report, supra note; Hamilton, supra note,
at 3-50 (discussing violence); Newton Minow and Craig LaMay, Abandoned in
the Wasteland: Children, Television, and the First Amendment 10-45 (1995)
(discussing children) Danny Schechter, The More You Watch, The Less You
Know (1997) (discussing content of news).
38 See Hamilton, supra, at 20-30, for evidence.
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3. Programming may not be sufficiently accessible to people
who are deaf or hard of hearing; this may be a particular
problem if citizens are unable to find out about emergencies.39
4. There may be too little coverage of serious issues, especially
during political campaigns. The relevant coverage may involve
sensationalism and “sound bites,” or attention to who is ahead
(“horserace issues”) rather than who thinks what and why. The
result may be an insufficiently informed citizenry.40
5. There may be too much violent programming in general,
with adverse consequences for adults, not only children.41 The
adverse consequences may include an increase in violence
(because of changes in social norms or “copycat” effects42),
general demoralization and fear, or a misperception of reality.
6. News coverage may be a form of “infotainment,” dealing not
with real issues, but with gossip about celebrities and charges of
various kinds.43
7. At least on the major networks, programming may be too
homogenous, in a form of “blind leading the blind”
programming. Since a significant percentage of Americans do
not receive cable television, and depend on broadcasters, the
result may be insufficient variety in programming.44
8. There may be too little substantive diversity of view—too
little debate among people with genuinely different

39 See Final Report, supra note *, at 30-31.
40 See Kiku Adatto, Sound-Bite Democracy (1995), for general discussion.
41 See Hamilton, supra note, at 20-30, for detailed discussion.
42 For evidence, see Elliott Aronson, The Social Animal 62-64, 266-69 (6 th ed.
1995).
43 See Schechter, supra note.
44 See below.
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perspectives about issues of policy and fact. Here too, the result
may be an insufficiently informed citizenry.45
9. The problem may be not homogeneity but heterogeneity,
which may result in a highly balkanized viewing public, in
which many or most people lack shared viewing experiences, or
in which people view programming that largely reinforces their
own convictions and prejudices.
10. It may be too expensive for candidates to reach the
electorate via television. The result may be excessive
competition to accumulate funds simply in order to have access
to television; this competition may have corrosive effects on the
electoral process. Free air time would be a possible response,
perhaps qualified by an obligation, on the part of the candidate,
to speak for at least 50% of the time, or to refrain from negative
campaigning.
To be sure, some of these problems cannot be corrected through
regulation that is either feasible or constitutional. Moreover, these
various conceptions of the relevant problem point toward diverse
solutions, some of which would raise serious first amendment
problems, as discussed below.46 A particular challenge is to develop
approaches that would allow a high degree of flexibility, minimize
government involvement in programming content, and also do some
good.
III. Preferences and Audiences
It has increasingly been urged that any objections to existing
television are elitist or outmoded.47 On one view, public interest
obligations have no place in modern law, particularly in light of the

45 See C. Edwin Baker, The Media That Citizens Need, 147 U Pa L Rev 317,
383-407 (1999).
46 See pp. below.
47 See Fowler and Brennan, supra note; Corn-Revere, supra note.
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decline of the “scarcity” rationale for regulation; it has even been
urged that the FCC no longer has any appropriate role.48
A conceptual point first: Though many people claim to argue
for “deregulation,” that route is not in fact an option, or at least not a
reasonable one. What “deregulation” really means is a shift from the
status quo to a system of different but emphatically legal regulation,
more specifically one of property and contract rights, in which
government does not impose specific public interest obligations but
instead sets up initial entitlements and then permits trades among
owners and producers. This is a regulatory system as much as any
other. If it seems close to the current system for newspapers and
magazines, it is no less a regulatory system for that; a great deal of
law (inevitably) governs the rights and duties of newspapers and
magazines. The only real form of deregulation is anarchy, and that is
not an option. The issue is thus not whether to “deregulate,” but
whether one or another regulatory system is better than imaginable
alternatives.
I therefore turn to the general question whether there remains
any reason for government to regulate broadcasting in the “public
interest.” My concern here is both theoretical and empirical. The
question is whether in the current market, broadcasters are likely to
provide viewers what they would like to see, and if so whether that
point is decisive on the question whether public interest obligations
should be imposed.49 The brief answer is that the idea that
broadcasters show “what viewers want” is a quite inadequate
response to the argument for public interest obligations.50 The
discussion deals with the technological present and the short-term
future; below I introduce complications from emerging technological
developments.

48 See Yochai Benkler & Lawrence Lessig, The New Republic, Dec. 14, 1998 at
15 (arguing that a growing body of research suggests the F.C.C. is unnecessary).
49 An excellent discussion, on which I draw at several points here, is C. Edwin
Baker, Giving the Audience What It Wants, 58 Ohio St. L.J. 311 (1997).
50 The following points are directed to the television market at the close of the
twentieth century and the opening of the twenty-first; later I discuss how they
bear on the market that is likely to emerge thereafter.
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A. Three Market Failures51
A well-functioning television market would promote the ideal of
consumer sovereignty. People would be able to choose from a range
of options, and suppliers would cater to their tastes. To a
considerable extent, of course, the existing system approaches this
reality. But there are three serious problems, each suggesting that
consumer sovereignty is not served by free markets in programming.
1. Eyeballs as the commodity
The first point is the most fundamental. Television is not an
ordinary product, for broadcasters do not sell programming to
viewers in return for cash. A system of “pay-per-view” would indeed
fit the usual commodity model; but “pay per view” continues to be a
rare practice. The difference between the existing broadcasting
market and pay-per-view is quite important. The key problem here
is that viewers do not pay a price, market or otherwise, for television.
On the contrary, it is more accurate to say that viewers are a
commodity, or a product, that broadcasters deliver to the people who
actually pay them: advertisers.52
This phenomenon introduces some serious distortions, at least if
we understand an ideal broadcasting market as one in which viewers
receive want they want. From the standpoint of consumer
sovereignty, and taking viewers as consumers, the role of advertisers
creates market failures. Of course broadcasters seek, other things
being equal, to deliver more rather than fewer viewers, because
advertisers seek, other things being equal, more rather than fewer
viewers. To this extent the broadcasting market may well provide
many or most viewers with what they “want.” But advertisers have
issues and agendas of their own, and the interests of advertisers can
push broadcasters in, or away from, directions that viewers, or
substantial numbers of them, would actually like.
This is a substantial difference from the ordinary marketplace.
Thus advertisers like certain demographic groups and dislike others,
even when the numbers are equal; they pay extra amounts in order to
51 These are market failures if it is assumed that the purpose of a well-functioning
television market is to ensure that programming is well-matched to viewer
preferences.
52 See C. Edwin Baker, Advertising and A Democratic Press 25-87 (1994).

15

Private Broadcasters and Public Interest (revised 04/99)

attract groups that are likely to purchase the relevant products, and
this affects programming content.53 Advertisers do not want
programming that draws product safety into question, at least not if
it is their own products, and sometimes more generally.54 In
addition, advertisers want programming that will put viewers in a
receptive purchasing mood, and hence not be too “depressing.”55
Advertisers also tend to dislike programming that is highly
controversial or that is too serious, and hence avoid sponsoring
shows that take stands on public issues.56 In these ways, the fact that
broadcasters are delivering viewers to advertisers—this is largely their
charge, under existing arrangements—can produce offerings that
diverge considerably from what would emerge if viewers were paying
directly for programming. To this extent the notion of consumer
sovereignty is seriously compromised.
2. Informational cascades and broadcaster homogeneity
A second problem is that it is not clear whether broadcasters are
now engaged, in anything like a systematic or scientific way, in
catering to public tastes. At first glance it would seem obvious that
broadcasters must be engaged in this endeavor (subject to the
qualification just stated); if broadcasters are maximizing anything,
they must be maximizing viewers. Attracting viewers is their job.57
But there is reason to question this judgment, at least in its simplest
form. Sometimes rational people make decisions not on the basis of a
full inspection of the alternatives, but on the basis of an
understanding of what other people are doing.58 Because people
obtain information from other people’s actions, individual actions
carry with them one or more “informational externalities,” which
potentially affect the decisions of others. Thus rational and
boundedly rational people, in business as elsewhere, rely on the

53

See id., at 30-35.
See id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 See Danny Schechter, The More You See, The Less You Know (1998).
58 Sushil Bikchandani et al., Learning from the Behavior of Others, 12 J. Econ.
Persp. 151, 164 (1998).
54
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signals provided by the words and deeds of others.59 The result can
be to produce cascade effects, as B follows A, and C follows A and
B, and D, as a rational agent, follows the collected wisdom embodied
in the actions of A, B, and C. Informational cascades can produce
unfortunate outcomes, in fact outcomes far worse than those that
would result if individuals accumulated information on their own.
Sometimes, moreover, people use the “availability” heuristic, by
which an event is measured as more probable if an instance of its
occurrence can be brought to mind.60 Using the availability heuristic,
broadcasters might reason that if one show or another has attracted
substantial viewers in the past, they should copy it. The result would
be “fads” and “fashions” in programming.61
In theory, then, broadcasters might be building on the
programming judgments of other broadcasters, often, perhaps,
reacting to the “availability” of salient recent instances in which a
particular program was especially popular (dealing, let us suppose,
with the O.J. Simpson trial) or especially unpopular (dealing, let us
suppose, with South Africa). If this is true, private decisions by
broadcasters
may
produce
both
mistakes
and
homogeneity—mistakes in the form of programming unlike what
viewers want, and homogeneity in the form of the “blind leading the
blind.”62
Recent evidence suggests that the theoretical account has
considerable truth. A careful study shows that there is a good deal of
simple imitation, as networks provide a certain kind of programming
simply by imitating whatever other networks are doing.63 Recently
59 In a related vein, see Andrew Caplin and John Leahy, Miracle on Seventh
Avenue: Information Externalities and Search, 108 Econ. J. 60 (1998).
60 See Timur Kuran and Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk
Regulation, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 163 (1999).
61 See note supra.
62 See David Hirshleifer, The Blind Leading the Blind: Social Influence, Fads,
and Informational Cascades, in The New Economics of Human Behavior 188
(Mariano Tommasi & Kathryn Ierulli eds., 1995).
63 See Sushil Bikchandani et al., Learning from the Behavior of Others, 12 J.
Econ. Persp. 151. 164 (1998); Robert E. Kennedy, Strategy Fads and
Competitive Convergence: An Empirical Test for Herd Behavior in Prime-Time
Television Broadcasting (Harvard Business School, January 1998).

17

Private Broadcasters and Public Interest (revised 04/99)

popular shows tend to create cascade effects. This imitative behavior
is not in the interest of viewers. On the contrary, it creates a kind of
homogeneity and uniformity in the broadcasting market, and thus
makes for problems in terms of providing what viewers “want.”64
This is not a conventional market failure, but it suggests that existing
decisions are unlikely to promote consumer sovereignty.
3. Externalities and collective action problems
Even if broadcasters did provide each viewer with what he or
she wanted, a significant problem would remain, and from the
economic point of view, this is probably the most serious of all.
Information is a public good, and once one person knows something
(about, for example, product hazards, asthma, official misconduct,
welfare reform, or abuse of power), the benefits of that knowledge
will probably accrue to others.65 Note in this regard Amartya Sen’s
remarkable finding that no famine has ever occurred in a democratic
party with a free press.66 This finding is complemented by a series of
less dramatic ones, showing the substantial benefits for individual
citizens of a media that is willing and able to devote attention to
public concerns, including the plight of the disadvantaged.67 But
individual choices by individual viewers may well produce too little
public interest programming in light of the fact that the benefits of
viewing such programming are not fully “internalized” by individual
viewers. Thus individually rational decisions may inflict costs on
others at the same time that they fail to confer benefits on others. In
this respect, the problem “is not that people choose unwisely as
individuals, but that the collective consequences of their choices
often turn out to be very different from what they desire or
anticipate.”68
Most generally, there are multiple external effects in the
broadcasting area; some of these are positive, but unlikely to be
64 See id.
65 An illuminating and detailed discussion is Baker, Giving the Audience What
It Wants, supra note, at 350-85.
66 See Amartya Sen and Jean Dreze, India 76 (1995).
67 Id. at 75-76, 173, 191.
68 Robert H. Frank and Phillip J. Cook, The Winner-Take-All Society 191
(1995). See also Pierre Bourdieu, On Television 9-29 (1998).
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generated sufficiently by individual choices, while others are
negative, and likely to be excessively produced by individual choices.
Consider a decision to watch violent programming.69 In short, the
effects of broadcasting depend on social interactions, and
broadcasting produces a range of collective goods and collective bads.
Many of the resulting problems are connected with democratic
ideals. Thus, for example, a culture in which each person sees a high
degree of serious programming may well lead to better political
judgments; media portrayals of violence can produce harm to others;
greater knowledge on the part of one person often leads to more
knowledge on the part of others with whom she interacts.70 Perhaps
most important, a degree of serious attention to public issues can
lead to improved governance through deterring abuses and
encouraging governmental response to serious problems. In these
various ways, public interest programming can produce social
benefits that will not be adequately captured by the individual
choices of individual citizens; the same is true for programming that
produces social costs, including increased criminal activity.71
B. Problems on Non-Market Criteria:
Children, Deliberative Democracy, and Related Issues
Many people object to purely market approaches to television.72
Perhaps television is not best understood as an ordinary commodity,
subject to the forces of supply and demand. There are several reasons
why this might be so. The unifying theme is that the American
political tradition is committed to the ideal of deliberative
democracy,73 an ideal that has animated first amendment doctrine
and media regulation in general.74 Even if the media market were
well-functioning from the economic point of view, there would be
room for measures designed to promote a well-functioning system of
69 See Hamilton, supra, at 3-49.
70 Baker, supra, at 350-367.
71 See id. at 355-56; see also James P. Hamilton, Channeling Violence: The
Economic Market for Violent Television Programming 20-30, 285-322 (1998).
72 See, eg., Baker, supra, at 355-65.
73 See Joseph Bessette, The Mild Voice of Reason 6-39 (1995).
74 See Minow and LaMay, supra note, at 15-65; Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy
and the Problem of Free Speech 53-92 (1993).
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democratic deliberation, especially in view of the importance of
television to people’s judgments about what issues are important, and
about what it is reasonable to think.75
1. Children and the hearing-impaired
A well-functioning market may fail to serve certain categories of
viewers. Of these the most obvious is children, who may be poorly
served by an absence of educational programming76 or adversely
affected by violent programming.77 It is possible to treat the resulting
problems as “externalities,” but the more natural conclusion is that
the television market is creating difficulties even in the absence of a
market failure. Because television has a significant role as an
educational instrument, the failure to serve children is a significant
problem.78 A well-functioning market may also disserve people who
are hard of hearing, if they are deprived of access to television by the
existing use of technology, a particular problem if they are unable to
watch the news or to understand descriptions of emergency
conditions. Here too there is potential room for a regulatory
response, partly in order to include deaf people in civic activities by
informing them of electoral issues and news in general.
2. Endogenous preferences
The public’s “tastes,” with respect to television programming, do
not come from nature or from the sky. They are partly a product of
current and recent practices by broadcasters and other programmers.
They are often generated by the market.79 What people want, in
short, is partly a product of what they are accustomed to seeing. It is
also a product of existing social norms, which can change over time,
and which are themselves responsive to existing commercial fare.
Tastes are formed, not just served, by broadcasters.
The point raises doubts about the idea that government policy
should simply take viewers’ tastes as given. In an era in which
75

See Shanto Iyengar and Donald Kindar, News That Matters (1987); Shanto
Iyengar, Is Anyone Responsible? How Television Frames Public Issues 127-44
(1991).
76 See Newton Minow and Craig LaMay, Abandoned in the Wasteland 10-65
(1995).
77 See Hamilton, supra, at 76-128.
78 See Minow and LaMay, supra, at 100-126.
79 Baker, supra note, at 404-410.
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broadcasters are providing a good deal of public interest
programming, dealing with serious issues in a serious way, many
members of the public will cultivate a taste for that kind of
programming. This effect would promote democratic ideals by
fostering information and helping to increase deliberation.80 In an
era in which broadcasters are carrying sensationalistic or violent
material, members of the public may well cultivate a taste for more of
the same. “Free marketeers have little to cheer about if all they can
claim is that the market is efficient at filling desires that the market
itself generates. . . . Just as culture affects preferences, so also do
markets influence culture. ”81 If this is so, the ideal of consumer
sovereignty is placed under some pressure; market activities cannot
easily be justified by reference to tastes that they themselves generate.
This point should not be overstated. Undoubtedly broadcasters
have limited power to push tastes very dramatically in one direction
or another. At a minimum, the idea that viewers’ tastes are
endogenous to existing fare should be taken as a cautionary note
about treating consumption choices as decisive for purposes of
policy. Combined with the point to follow, it suggests that there is
nothing illegitimate about policies that depart from consumption
choices in favor of widely held social aspirations. But there is reason
for broader concern about the adverse effects of certain kinds of
programming—including a failure to cover serious issues in a serious
way—on democratic judgments.82
3. Citizens, consumers, and precommitment strategies
There is a difference between what people want in their capacity
as viewers (or “consumers of broadcasting”) and what they want in
their capacity as citizens.83 Both preferences and values are a function
of the setting in which people find themselves; they are emphatically
a product of social role. In these circumstances, it would be wrong to
80 For evidence that the effects of television on this count are far from fanciful,
see Iyengar, Is Anyone Responsible?, supra note, at 26-116.
81 Robert H. Frank and Philip J. Cook, The Winner-Take-All Society 201
(1995).
82 See Iyengar, Is Anyone Responsible?, supra note, at 46-68.
83 A good discussion is Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Consumer Preferences,
Citizen Preferences, and the Provision of Public Goods, 108 Yale L.J. 377
(1998).
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think that the choices of individual viewers are definitive, or
definitional, with respect to the question of individual preference of
value. On the contrary, a democratic public, engaged in deliberation
about the world of telecommunications, may legitimately seek
regulations embodying aspirations that diverge from their
consumption choices. Participants in politics may be attempting to
promote their meta-preferences, or their preferences about their own
preferences; they may be attempting to carry out a precommitment
strategy of some kind; they may be more altruistic or other-regarding
in their capacity as citizens, perhaps because of the nature of the
goods involved; they may be more optimistic about the prospects for
change when acting collectively.84
When participants in democracy attempt to make things better,
and do not simply track their consumption choices, it is not helpful
to disparage their efforts as “paternalism” or as “meddling.”
Consumers should not be confused with citizens; this is a form of
democracy in action.85 Thus it is entirely appropriate for government
to respond to people’s aspirations and commitments as expressed in
the public realm. This is especially so when a democratic polity is
itself attempting to ensure more in the way of democratic
deliberation.
C. Principle and Policy
These points suggest that there is good reason, in principle, for
some kind of regulatory response to existing markets in television.
But nothing said thus far argues for any particular governmental
initiative. There is no simple “match” between the identifiable
market and nonmarket failures and public interest requirements in
general. For example, it is hard to imagine a legitimate governmental
response to the problem of excessive homogeneity on the major
networks. Any such response is likely to correct only a piece of the
problem, as through, for example, efforts to encourage more serious
coverage of political campaigns. We have also seen that existing
public interest obligations are extremely varied; each of them must be
84 The latter two points are emphasized in id. at 399-401; in the particular
context of broadcasting, see Baker, Giving the Audience What It Wants, supra,
at 401-04..
85 See Baker, Giving the Audience What It Wants, supra, at 401-11.
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assessed on its own. At first glance, policies that attempt to promote
better programming for children are most securely supported by the
arguments made thus far (as a response to what is reasonably
classified as a market failure, and also as a way of increasing positive
externalities and of promoting social aspirations). Efforts to ensure
that deaf people are able to enjoy television, through closed
captioning, are justifiable on similar grounds. There is room also for
efforts to ensure better coverage of electoral campaigns—perhaps
through a requirement of free air time for candidates, perhaps
through a private “code” designed to ensure more substantive
discussion. Disclosure requirements, allowing the public to have a
general sense of broadcaster performance, seem to be justified as a
non-intrusive method for allowing civic aspirations to help influence
future programming. As a response to possibly unfortunate effects on
advertiser pressures, and also as a way of ensuring against a
destructive “race to the bottom” with respect to programming
content, a general code of broadcaster behavior seems appealing (see
Part VII below).
There are pragmatic questions as well. To say that a form of
response may be justified in principle is not at all to say that it will
succeed in practice. Just as in the environmental area, where
command-and-control regulation has produced unintended adverse
consequences,86 many problems have emerged with command-andcontrol regulation of the kind that has typified FCC regulation for
most of its history. Consider, for example, the fairness doctrine,
designed to ensure exposure to public issues and to allow diverse
voices to have access to the airwaves. A serious problem with the
fairness doctrine is that it appears to have discouraged stations from
covering controversial issues at all, and to ensure a kind of bland
uniformity, thus disserving democratic goals.87 A uniform set of
mandates may also produce waste and poor programming; if a
network is especially bad at generating good shows for children, and
has a hard time attracting a children’s audience, is it so clear that that
network should be faced with the same obligations as everyone else?
86 See Cass R. Sunstein, Free Markets and Social Justice 245-383 (1997).
87 See Thomas W. Hazlett & David W. Sosa, Was the Fairness Doctrine a
“Chilling Effect” ? Evidence from the Postderegulation Radio Market, 26 J.
Legal Stud. 279 (1997)
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In view of the great diversity of the broadcasting market, a “one size
fits all” approach may be far more costly, and less effective, than
creative alternatives.
It is useful to distinguish here between approaches that suppress
markets and approaches that supplement markets.88 In regulatory
policy, market-suppressing approaches include minimum wage and
maximum hour laws, or price and wage controls. Marketsupplementing approaches include jobs training programs and the
earned income tax credit. In telecommunications policy, the fairness
doctrine was a market-suppressing remedy; so too with a
requirement that broadcasters provide three hours of educational
programming per week, or a certain amount of time for candidates
for public office. By contrast, the devotion of public funds to the
Public Broadcasting System is a market-supplementing approach; so
too with a subsidy granted to each of the networks, designed to
ensure a certain amount of public interest programming. Of course
the line between the two can be thin when the marketsupplementing approach ends up displacing material that would
otherwise be supplied in accordance with forces of supply and
demand.
D. Communications Past, Present, and Future:
Planned Obsolescence and Beyond
The arguments offered thus far have not specifically addressed
the new market in communications. An especially important
question is whether emerging changes in television technology
strengthen the case for satisfaction with market outcomes.
1. Predicting the future
The most striking feature of the emerging communications
market is a dramatic increase in the number of available stations and
programming options. The existing regulatory regime was designed
for a system with three private broadcasting networks and the Public
Broadcasting System (PBS). In 1999, about 32% of people who have
television remain dependent on broadcasters, which means that they

88 See Amartya Sen and Jean Dreze, India 21-24 (1997) (discussing market
supplementing strategies).
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have access to five or six stations.89 This means that about two-thirds
of viewers have access to between fifty and one hundred stations.,
including the all-news stations C-Span and CNN, and a range of
“soft news” stations such as MSNBC. By itself this is an extremely
significant change, and the shift from this situation to one in which
most people have access to (say) 500 stations may be only one of
degree. More dramatic innovations are coming in the future, with
the possible ultimate “convergence” of various television sources,
including digital television and the Internet.90 If a “television set”
becomes akin to a computer monitor that provides access to the full
range of American magazines, would not the case for public interest
regulation be substantially weakened? The foregoing discussion
offers an ambivalent answer. Some of the problems with the market
status quo would dissipate, but others would remain. Let us explore
these questions in more detail.
For purposes of analysis, we might separate the market for
television into four rough stages. The first is that of the period
between the 1940s and 1960s—the market for which the existing
regulatory system was designed; call this the old regime. As noted, the
old regime included three large networks and also PBS; the four
stations provided all of what Americans knew as television. The
second market is one of the late 1990s; call this the transitional state.
Here the most dramatic change in the number of available options.
This is a system in which a substantial percentage (about 32%) of the
viewing public relies on five broadcasters and PBS, but in which 68%
of the public has access to cable television, and thus is able to choose
among fifty or more options. Of that 68%, a growing segment is able
to see well over 100 stations. But in the transitional state,
broadcasters continue to have a special role, both because a
substantial number of people do not have access to cable at all, and
because even cable viewers watch the major networks
disproportionately.
The third stage, likely to begin shortly, is continuous with the
transitional state; call this the stage of multiple options. This is a
market in which broadcasters continue to be seen by more people
89 See Statistial Abstract of the United States, No. 888, Utilization of Selected
Media: 1970 to 1998 (1998).
90 See Owen, supra note 1.
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than other providers, but are decreasingly distinctive in terms of
either the size or nature of their audience. More people will have
access to cable or other options, and many of those who rely on
broadcasting will be able to have more options too. But broadcasters
will continue to be seen by a disproportionate number of people, if
only because a shrinking but still substantial percentage of viewers
will continue to have access only to broadcasters; this significant
subgroup is important partly because of its sheer size (unlikely to
drop below 20% for at least a decade) and partly because it includes
an especially high percentage of people, including children, who are
poor and poorly educated. In this stage, broadcasters will in some
ways be akin to Newsweek, Time, and US News and World Report,
in the sense that they will have a relatively dominant role in terms of
sheer numbers. But they will have to compete with other
programmers, some general, some specialized, with analogues (most
of them now in place) to Sports Illustrated, The Economist, Dog
Fancy, National Review, National Geographic, the New Republic,
Consumer Reports, Playboy, and many more. This third stage will
be marked by the rise of digital television, which is allowing
broadcasters to “multiplex,” that is, to provide two, three, four, or
even five programs where they could previously provide only one.
The result may be to make broadcasters themselves more
specialized.91 It is hard to predict the future here, but the best
prediction is that a situation of this kind will prevail for the next
decade and more.
The final stage—call it one of technological convergence—is one
of substantial or possibly even complete shrinkage in the distinctive
role of broadcasters.92 This is a stage in which television
programming can be provided via the Internet, over telephone lines,
or both; a television may itself be a simple computer monitor,
connected to various programming sources from which viewers may
make selections. If it is economically feasible for broadcasters to
continue as such, they are likely to have little of a special role and
will be among a large number of providers. At most, and extending
91 See note supra.
92

This shrinkage may or may not occur as a result of convergence. For
discussion, see Owen, supra, at 312 (“Whether convergence is inevitable, or even
likely, is still unclear”).
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the analogy to Time or Newsweek, they will be have a somewhat
larger and more general audience than most of their competitors.
Perhaps they will not be distinctive at all. The most extreme version
of this final stage would be akin to the market for books, where
people make individual choices, not filtered by some intermediary
offering packages.93
2. Regulatory options and technological change
Each of the arguments offered here makes sense for old regime
and the transitional state. They also seem to make sense for the
emerging third stage of multiple options; recall that even here, a
substantial segment of the public will depend on broadcasters only,
and people with access to cable and other alternatives continue,
statistically speaking, to watch a disproportionate amount of
broadcast fare. But arguments for public interest obligations would
be less sensible as applied to a market in which broadcasters occupy
no special role, partly because some of the relevant problems would
be diminished, partly because in such a market, it seems peculiar to
impose on broadcasters, and no one else, a special duty to protect
public interest goals. In that market, perhaps everyone should be
faced with some of the requirements discussed below (in particular
the disclosure requirement). But the case for others (such as uniform
mandates, a broadcaster-only code, or pay or play) would be
weakened, not least since it would seem arbitrary to single out
broadcasters for such requirements.
Let us examine, in more detail, the force of the particular
arguments as the market changes over time. Even if informational
influences produce a degree of homogeneity among broadcasters,
and even if broadcasters tend to follow one another, the increasing
number of channels means that for most Americans, there is far
more heterogeneity now than there was a decade ago, and a great
deal more heterogeneity is likely in the near future, perhaps
dramatically increasing heterogeneity. At the same time, advertisers
are likely to have an increasingly weak role in determining overall
programming content. When a few broadcasters exhausted the
market, advertiser preferences could have a more substantial effect
93 I put to one side the complexities introduced by Amazon.com and various
book clubs.
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than they now do. Thus two of the arguments made
above—involving the market failures from advertiser pressures and
from informational cascades—are significantly weakened. Of course
these changes should not be overstated. Recall that 32% of American
households with televisions do not have cable television, and that a
substantial number of Americans are likely to depend on over-the-air
programming for the not-too-distant future; hence the increasing
heterogeneity is not quite as dramatic as it might seem.
But some of the arguments offered above—especially those
focussed on democratic ideals—retain considerable force. Even in
the very long term, there will continue to be substantial external
benefits from public interest programming, benefits that are not
adequately captured by individual viewer choices. And to the extent
that citizens seek to push communications policy toward (for
example) more and better programming for children, or free air time
for candidates, or greater access for the deaf people, changes in the
evolving market offers only partial answers. Heterogeneity may be an
inadequate solution here. It is reasonable for citizens to believe that
there should be very general public exposure to public issues, and
hence that it is not sufficient to have one, or two, or three, or even
more stations (CNN, C-SPAN, MSNBC) that take such issues
seriously. Indeed, citizens may favor a kind of general
precommitment strategy—operating against their own particular
viewing choices—through which broadcasters, at least, are required
to devote some time to educational or civic programming. Thus the
presence of news-only stations, especially on cable, is not a sufficient
response to those who want broadcasters to do more and better. It is
insufficient partly because a significant segment of the population
will have no access to cable at all, and partly because in their capacity
as citizens, people may favor a precommitment strategy that
overcomes certain individual viewing choices.
In the very long run, this argument too will be weakened. As we
have seen, the strongest objection would come when broadcasters are
not genuinely distinctive; when this is the case, it would seem
arbitrary to encourage broadcasters, but not others, to provide certain
kinds of programming. In the face of such changes, it will indeed
make sense to adapt the proposals discussed below to a dramatically
changed market. But it is hard to explore this question in the
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abstract; everything turns on the particular regulatory proposal, and
instrument, that is at issue. The question of adaptation will arise at
several points below. For now let us observe only that in the extreme
situation—when broadcasters are not in any sense distinctive—the
case for regulation limited to broadcasting would be very weak, and
alternative strategies, involving funding of public interest
programming , would be better. Thus my emphasis here—on
disclosure, economic incentives, and voluntary self-regulation—is
designed for a (likely not inconsiderable) period in which
broadcasters continue to occupy a special role. To simplify a complex
story, the very long-term may call for a combination of public
subsidies for high-quality programming and disclosure requirements
for general-interest stations. But in the shorter term, there is a great
deal more to consider.
IV. Disclosure
Consider a simple proposal: Broadcasters should be required to
disclose, in some detail and on a quarterly basis, all of their public service
and public interest activities. The disclosure might include an
accounting of any free air time provided to candidates, educational
programming, charitable activities, programming designed for
traditionally under-served communities, closed captioning for the
hearing impaired, local programming, and public service
announcements.94 The hope, vindicated by experience with similar
approaches in environmental law,95 is that a disclosure requirement
will by itself trigger improved performance, by creating a kind of
competition to do better, and by enlisting various social pressures in
the direction of improved performance. A requirement of this sort
would be part of a general trend in federal regulation, one with
considerable promise.96
94 Current law requires disclosures of a subset of this material: children’s
programming and non-entertainment programming responsive to ascertained
community needs. See 47 C.F.R. 3526(a)(8)(I), (iii) and 47 C.F.R. 3527(a)(7).
95 Madhu Khanna et al., Toxic Release Information: A Policy Tool for
Environmental Protection, 36 J. Env. Economics and Management 243 (1998).
96 See Wesley A. Magat and W. Kip Viscusi, Informational Approaches to
Regulation (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and
Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U Pa L Rev 613, 618-29 (1999).
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A. Precursors
Many statutes and regulations now require the disclosure of
information. Some of these are designed to assist consumers in
making informed choices; such statutes are meant to be marketenhancing. By contrast, others are designed to trigger political rather
than market safeguards; such statutes are meant to enhance
democratic processes. The most famous of these is NEPA. Enacted
in 1972, the principal goal of NEPA is to require government to
compile and disclose environmentally-related information before
government goes forward with any projects having a major effect on
the environment.97 NEPA does not require government to give
environmental effects any particular weight, nor is there judicial
review of the substance of agency decisions.98 The purpose of
disclosure is principally to trigger political safeguards, coming from
the government’s own judgments or from external pressure.99 Hence
any governmental indifference to adverse environmental effects is
perfectly acceptable under NEPA: the idea behind the statute is that
if the public is not indifferent, the government will have to give some
weight to environmental effects.
Probably the most successful experiment in information
disclosure is the Emergency Planning and Community Right-toKnow Act (EPCRA).100 Under this statute, firms and individuals
must report, to state and local government, the quantities of
potentially hazardous chemicals that have been stored or released
into the environment. Users of such chemicals must report to their
local fire departments about the location, types, and quantities of
stored chemicals. They must also give information about potential
adverse health effects. On the basis of the relevant results, the EPA
publishes pollution data about the releases of over 300 chemical from

97 See Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy
Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
98 See Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223
(1980).
99 See id.
10042 U.S.C. §§ 11,001-11050 (1994)
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over 20,000 facilities.101 This has been an exceptional success story,
one that has well exceeded expectations at the time of enactment.102
A detailed report suggests that EPCRA has had important beneficial
effects, spurring innovative, cost-effective programs from the EPA
and from state and local government.103
Many other statutes involving health, safety, and the
environment fall in this general category. The Animal Welfare Act is
designed partly to ensure publicity about the treatment of animals;
thus covered laboratories are required to file reports with the
government about their conduct,104 with the apparent thought that
the reports will deter noncompliance and also allow continuing
monitoring. In addition to its various command-and-control
provisions, the Clean Air Act requires companies to create and
disclose “risk management plans” involving accidental releases of
chemicals; the plans must include a worse case scenario.105 The Safe
Drinking Water Act was amended in 1996 to require annual
“consumer confidence reports,” to be developed and disseminated by
community water suppliers.106 Statutes governing discrimination and
medical care also seem committed partly to the idea that “sunlight is
the best of disinfectants”107; thus they require covered institutions to
compile reports about their conduct and compliance with applicable
law. The Federal Election Campaign Act requires political
committees to disclose a great deal of information about their
activities.
101 See James P. Hamilton, Channeling Violence: The Economic Market for
Violent Television Programming 302 (1998).
102 See Madhu Khanna et al., Toxic Release Information: A Policy Tool for
Environmental Protection, 36 J. Env. Economics and Management 243 (1998)
(discussing success of toxic release inventory and stockholder responses to release
of relevant information); Robert V. Percival et al., Environmental Regulation:
Law, Science, and Policy 612-16 (2d ed. 1996) (discussing informational
approaches).
103See GAO, Toxic Chemicals, Report to the Congress (1991).
104 Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2159 (1994).
105 42 U.S.C. 7412(r).
106 42 U.S.C. 300 g-3 (c)(4) (1996).
107 The phrase comes from Louis D. Brandeis, Other People’s Money 92
(1914).
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Of course there is an overlap between informational regulation
designed to assist consumers and informational regulation designed
to trigger political checks. A statute that requires companies to place
“eco-labels” on their products may produce little in the way of
consumer response, but shareholders and participants in the
democratic process may attempt to sanction those whose labels reveal
environmentally destructive behavior. Companies will know this in
advance, with likely behavioral consequences. The risk of sanctions
from shareholders and state legislatures may well produce
environmental improvement even without regulation.108
A great deal of recent attention has been given to informational
regulation in the particular context of the communications industry.
As an alternative to direct regulation, which raises especially severe
first amendment problems, government might attempt to increase
information instead. Thus the mandatory “v-chip” is intended to
permit parents to block programming that people want to exclude
from their homes; the v-chip is supposed to work hand-in-hand with
a ratings system.109 Similarly, a provision of the 1996
Telecommunications Act requires television manufacturers to
include technology capable of reading a program rating mechanism;
requires the FCC to create a ratings methodology if the industry
does not produce an acceptable ratings plan within a year; and
requires that broadcasters include a rating in their signals if the
relevant program is rated.110 Spurred by this statute, the networks
have generated a system for television ratings, which is now in
place.111 The question is whether disclosure requirements might be
enlisted more generally.
B. Rationale
Why has information disclosure become such a popular
regulatory tool? There are several answers. For various reasons, a
108 Consider the eco-label required by the European Union. see Council
Regulation 880/92 of 23 March 1992, On a Community Eco-Lavel Award
Scheme, 1992 O.J. (L 99).
109 See James P. Hamilton, Channeling Violence: The Economic Market for
Violent Television Programming 289-92 (1998).
110 See id. at 302 (1998).
111 See id. at 304-11.
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market failure may come in the form of an inadequate supply of
information.112 Because information is generally113 a public
good—something that if provided to one is also provided to all or
many—workers and consumers may attempt to free ride on the
efforts of others, with the result that too little information is
provided. For this reason, compulsory disclosure of information can
provide the simplest and most direct response to the relevant market
failure.
It is increasingly recognized that information is often a far less
expensive and more efficient strategy than command-and-control,
which consists of rigid mandates about regulatory ends (a certain
percentage reduction in sulfur dioxide, for example), regulatory
means (a technological mandate, for example, for cars), or both.114 A
chief advantage of informational regulation is its comparative
flexibility. If consumers are informed of the salt and sugar content of
foods, they can proceed as they wish, trading off various product
characteristics however they see fit. If workers are given information
about the risks posed by their workplace, they can trade safety
against other possible variables (such as salary, investments for
children or retirement, and leisure).115 If viewers know the content of
television programs in advance, they can use market methods (by
failing to watch) or political methods (by complaining to stations) to
induce changes. From the standpoint of efficiency, information
remedies can be better than either command-and-control regulation
or than reliance on unregulated markets alone.
112 See Anthony I. Ogus, Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory 121125 (1994).
113 Of course it is possible to give information more “private good”
characteristics, and innovative approaches can be expected in the next decade.
Consider, for example, fees for access to information on the Internet, or the
subscription-based Consumer Reports; neither of these approaches converts
information into a private good but both reduce the range of people who may,
without high cost, have access to it. Thus it is possible to imagine a range of
approaches that would diminish the cost of access for some or money while
increasing it, or holding it constant, for others.
114 See Anthony I. Ogus, Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory 121149 (1994); Stephen Breyer, Regulation and its Reform 271-83 (1982).
115 See Cass R. Sunstein, Free Markets and Social Justice 329-30 (1997).
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From the democratic point of view, informational regulation
also has substantial advantages. A well-functioning system of
deliberative democracy requires a certain degree of information, so
that citizens can engage in their monitoring and deliberative tasks.
Subject as they are to parochial pressures, segments of government
may have insufficient incentive to disclose information on their own;
consider FOIA or FECA, where the self-interest of government or
private groups may press in the direction of too little disclosure.
Thus a good way to enable citizens to oversee private or public
action, and also to assess the need for less, more, or different
regulation, is to inform them of both private and public activity. The
very fact that the public will be in a position to engage in general
monitoring may well be a spur to desirable outcomes.
EPCRA is the most obvious example here. Sharp, costeffective, and largely unanticipated reductions in toxic releases have
come about without anything in the way of direct regulation.116 One
of the causes appears to be adverse effects on stock prices from
repeated disclosure of high levels of toxic releases.117 In the area of
broadcasting, it is possible to hope that disclosure of public interest
programming, and the mere need to compile the information each
year, can increase educational and public affairs programming
without involving government mandates at all. Thus a primary virtue
of informational regulation is that it triggers political safeguards and
allows citizens a continuing oversight role, one that is, in the best
cases, largely self-enforcing.
None of this is to say that informational regulation is always
effective or desirable. Under imaginable assumptions such regulation
will be inferior to command-and-control regulation and to reliance
on markets unaccompanied by disclosure requirements. And there
are potential problems with informational strategies, which may be
expensive, sometimes costing more than they are worth, and which
may be ineffectual or even counterproductive. Whether these are
convincing objections depends on the incentives faced by those who
disclose, which are likely to differ with context. To know whether
116 See Robert V. Percival et al., Environmental Regulation: Law, Science, and
Policy 611-16 (2d ed. 1996).
117 See Madhu Khanna et al., Toxics Release Information: A Policy Tool for
Environmental Protection, 36 J. Env. Ec. And Management 243 (1998).

Chicago Law and Economics Working Paper

34

disclosure is an effective alternative to other forms of regulation, it is
necessary to have a concrete understanding of the circumstances in
which disclosure will fulfill its intended goals. Undoubtedly the most
successful cases involve well-organized groups able to impose
reputational and financial harm on firms engaged in harmful
activity.118
C. The Minimal Proposal
We are now in a position to discuss a disclosure requirement for
public interest programming in somewhat more detail. On a
quarterly basis, every broadcaster should be required to make public
the full range of public interest and public service activities in which
it engages in every year. The relevant activities might involve free air
time for candidates, educational programming, public service
announcements, access for disabled viewers (as through closed
captioning or video descriptions), charitable activities, emergency
warnings and services, and the like. The FCC should require a
completion of a relatively simple form to ensure accurate and
uniform accounting, and FCC staff should take steps to sanction
those stations that have failed to disclose, or that have done so
inaccurately. A special advantage of disclosure requirements is that
they appear to fit well with the emerging communications market
insofar as they allow maximum flexibility and do not impose
requirements that may be rapidly outrun by changing technologies.
Even in a period in which broadcasters are akin to Time and
Newsweek, such requirements would make a good deal of sense as a
means of creating some democratic pressure for improvement.119 Of
118 See Gunningham and Grabosky, supra note, at 296-300.
119 An obvious question is whether, if the case for disclosure has been made out,
similar requirements ought to be imposed on magazines and even newspapers.
Indeed, the same question might be asked about economic incentives and
voluntary self-regulation, as discussed below. I do not discuss those questions
here. For those who believe that there is increasingly little difference between
television and print media, it might seem that if requirements of this sort are not
desirable for the latter, they are also undesirable for the former. The best response
to this argument is in Bollinger, supra note, with the suggestion that the different
regulatory regimes for the broadcast and print media are well-suited to two
different images of press freedom, one image involving democratic selfgovernment, the other involving a form of economic laissez-faire. Bollinger
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course it is reasonable to think that as the market evolves, disclosure
requirements should be placed on all programmers, and not limited
to broadcasters. The hope would be that such requirements would
produce a kind of “race,” at least in some markets, to do more and
better.
Is the hope realistic? People did not anticipate that the Toxic
Release Inventory (TRI) would by itself spur behavioral changes; the
question is whether the same forces might operate here. The answer
depends on whether the mechanisms that have produced significant
voluntary changes in the environmental arena will also be triggered
in this setting. In order for voluntary improvements to occur, the
disclosure requirements must be accompanied by political activity
and existing norms that might be enlisted on behalf of increased
public interest programming. With respect to the TRI, wellorganized groups have been able to threaten, or to use, publicity so as
to induce companies to undertake voluntary reductions. It appears
that environmental grounds have mobilized when disclosure shows
high levels of toxic emissions; anticipating this, companies have
reduced emissions voluntarily.120 Thus the effect of the TRI has been
to draw private and perhaps governmental attention to the most
serious polluters, who have an incentive to reduce on their own.
Once this process is underway, there has been a kind of competition
to produce further reductions, as each polluter seeks to be
substantially below the group of most serious polluters.
The question is whether the same might happen here. The
answer depends first on the existence of external monitoring and
second on the power of the monitors to impose reputational or
financial harm on broadcasters whose record is poor.121 The external
believes that the existing of two parallel regulatory regimes makes appropriate
space for each of these images, and that if one regulatory regime goes wrong
(through, for example, excessive regulation of television, or an excessive “race to
the bottom” in magazines), the other can serve as a corrective. This Article is in
the general spirit of Bollinger’s approach, but it attempts to develop more flexible
tools for implementing it, tools that are better adapted to the emerging television
market.
120 See note supra.
121 See Madhu Khanna et al., Toxics Release Information: A Policy Tool for
Environmental Protection, 36 J. Env. Ec. And Management 243 (1998);
Gunningham and Grabosky, supra, at 296-300.
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monitors may include public interest groups seeking to “shame”
badly performing broadcasters; they may include rivals, who seek to
create a kind of “race to the top.” From the disclosures, it should be
clear which broadcasters are doing least to promote the public
interest, and perhaps those broadcasters will be specially targeted by
private groups and competitors. The ultimate effect cannot be
known a priori. Much depends on the possibility of private monitors.
If public interest organizations, and viewers who favor certain
programming, are able to mobilize, perhaps in concert with certain
members of the mass media, substantial behavioral effects might be
expected. It is even possible that a disclosure requirement would help
create its own monitors. On the other hand, it is possible that toxic
releases are such a salient and easily quantified public “bad” that a
political response is quite likely; perhaps a failure to provide public
interest programming is a far less salient “bad.” It is even possible
that diverse conceptions of what counts as a “bad” would lead to
inappropriate (but successful) pressures, if (for example) politically
controversial programming, or programming that challenges popular
convictions, receives public opprobrium.
But in view of the relative unintrusiveness of a disclosure
requirement, and the flexibility of any private responses, this
approach is certainly worth trying. At worst, little will be lost. At
most, much will be gained, probably in the form of better
programming, and in any case in the form of greater information
about the actual performance of the broadcasting industry—and also
about the circumstances in which disclosure requirements will be
effective on their own. In light of the aspirations of most viewers, the
likely result of disclosure will be to improve the quality and quantity
of both educational and civic programming, in a way that promotes
the goals of a well-functioning deliberative democracy.
V. Economic Incentives
In this section I explore the possibility that broadcasters might
meet their public interest responsibilities, not through a set of
uniform requirements, but through economic incentives. As we will
see, the most creative and promising approach, modeled on recent
environmental reforms, involves “play or pay,” in which broadcasters
are given a choice between complying with public interest
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requirements or paying someone else to put public interest
programming on the air. I begin with a discussion of “play or pay,”
and then move to a more ambitious discussion of the alternatives,
growing out of the law of tort and posing a debate between marketsuppressing and market-supplementing approaches.
A. Of Nature and Coase
Ronald Coase’s work on efficiency, free trades, and transactions
costs originated in the area of communications, and in particular in
an attack on the FCC; but it has been most influential in the
environmental arena.122 In that area, there has been a great deal of
dissatisfaction with rigid governmental commands, and there has
also been an unmistakable movement in the direction of more
flexible economic instruments, which are likely to be far more
efficient.123 A command might say, for example, that every coal-fired
power plant must reduce its sulfur dioxide emissions by 50%, or that
it must use technology of a governmentally specified kind. With
respect to environmental protection, incentives typically come in two
different forms: pollution fees, imposed on those who impose
environmental harm, and tradeable pollution rights or “licenses,”
given to those who produce pollution. For example, government
might say that companies must pay a certain amount per unit of
sulfur dioxide emission. Alternatively, government might say that
each company is permitted to emit a certain specified amount of
sulfur dioxide, but that its permission, or right, can be bought and
sold on the free market. On the pollution fee model, it pays to
reduce pollution simply in order to reduce the level of the tax. On
the tradeable pollution right model, it also pays to reduce pollution,
because the reduction can be used to engage in more of the relevant
activity or in order to obtain money from another who cannot reduce
so cheaply. Fees or tradeable licenses should create good dynamic

122 See R.H. Coase, The Market for Goods and the Market for Ideas, 64 Am.
Econ. Rev. 384 (1974), reprinted in R.H. Coase, Articles on Economics and
Economists 64 (1994); R. H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission,
2 J. L. & Econ. 1(1959).
123 See Gunningham and Grabosky, supra note, at 69, 391-421.
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incentives for pollution reduction, and also move environmental
protection in the direction of greater cost-effectiveness.124
There is a complex literature on the choice between pollution
fees and tradeable emission rights.125 The solution depends largely
on an inquiry into what government knows and does not know.126 In
general, a fee is better if the government is able to calculate the
damage done per unit of pollution, but has difficulty in calculating
the appropriate aggregate pollution level. In those circumstances, a
fee is better because the government is unlikely to err by setting it,
whereas a system of tradeable permits will produce mistakes. By
contrast, a tradeable permit is better if the government knows the
appropriate aggregate level, but is unable to calculate the damage
done per unit of pollution. In either case, government can take
advantage of the informational advantage held by private businesses
participating in pollution control, so as to allow them to decide on
the most effective, least-cost method of achieving any particular
pollution reduction. If it is extremely expensive for company A to
reduce its current level, it may choose to pay a high tax. Or—if the
system is one of tradeable pollution rights—it may simply pay
someone else, capable of reducing pollution more cheaply, to
produce the relevant reduction instead. For any desired level of
reduction, a system of economic incentives should produce the right
result at a lower cost, by allocating burdens to those most able to
bear them.
B. Taxes, Public Bads, Hot Potatoes, and Cold Spots
Although the FCC has experimented with allocating
communications rights via auction, little thought has been given to
the possibility of using economic incentives to promote public
interest goals in the communications market. In principle, however,
both the “fees” approach and the license approach may well be
preferable to government commands. At least this is so if we think of
public interest programming as a “good,” which people should pay
124 See William J. Baumol & Wallace E. Oates, The Theory of Environmental
Policy (2d ed. 1988).
125 For an overview, see Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the
Regulatory State, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 72-85 (1995).
126 See Stephen Breyer, Regulation and its Reform 271-83 (1982).
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for failing to produce, just as pollution is a “bad,” which people
should pay for producing. Consider educational programming and
free time for presidential elections. Suppose, for example, that ABC
is in an especially good position to produce high-quality
programming for children, whereas CBS is in an especially good
position to promote high-quality programming involving
presidential elections. Rather than requiring both ABC and CBS to
produce educational programming and programming involving
presidential elections, the government might allow each to pay a fee
if it is to be relieved of the requirement of providing one or the
other. This is the “tax” model of public interest programming.
Alternatively, it might adapt the emission fee model, and allow CBS
to sell ABC its obligation with respect to educational programming,
while permitting ABC to sell CBS its obligation with respect to
presidential elections.
A large problem with a tax is that it is very hard to calculate it.
Should government use market measures of some kind, or attempt to
capture the public loss, or lost public gain, from the broadcasters’
behavior? Either approach would be quite difficult. In these
circumstances, the simplest approach would be for government to
experiment with “pay or play” approaches, in which broadcasters
have a presumptive obligation to provide public service programming
but can buy their way out by paying someone to provide that
programming instead. Such approaches have also had considerable
success in the environmental area, despite a number of familiar
reservations.127 People have objected, for example, that emissions
trading will make an unfortunate “statement” about pollution, thus
legitimizing it,128 or that trading will result in the concentration of
pollution in dangerous “hot spots,” or that the administrative
burdens of a trading of system are overwhelming. Practice has
generally shown these objections to be unconvincing.129 If there is an
analogy between environmental protection and broadcasting
127 See Stavins, supra note.
128 See Steven Kelman, What Price Incentives?: Economists and the
Environment 110-165 (1981).
129 See Robert Stavins, What Can We Learn From the Grand Policy
Experiment? Lessons from SO2 Allowance Trading, 12 J. Econ. Persp. 69
(1998).
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regulation,130 a system in which those who do not provide public
interest programming must pay a kind of “fee” has an important
advantage, because it is so much more flexible than one in which the
government imposes uniform obligations on everyone. In this
respect, a system of “pay or play” seems to be the most cost-effective
means of promoting public interest goals, just as emissions trading
are the most cost-effective means of reducing pollution. For those
who dislike it, a public interest obligation can be treated as a kind of
“hot potato”; fortunately, from their point of view, it is one that they
can transfer to others, as a gift accompanied by cash.
It is possible to respond, as has been conventionally thought,
that public interest responsibilities are a general part of the public
trust and not alienable, and hence that broadcasters should not be
permitted to “buy their way” out of those obligations. But it is
unclear what content to give to this statement; the question is what
concrete harm would be created by a right to “pay” rather than play.
If the pay or play option had corrosive effects on the norms of the
broadcasting industry, by making people take public responsibilities
less seriously, that would indeed be a problem; but there is little
reason to believe that the option would have this effect. The simple
question is this: What if a broadcaster was willing to give $10 million
to PBS in return for every minute, or every thirty seconds, of relief
from a public interest responsibility? At first glance, the nation
would be better off as a result. Any objection to a system of tradeable
rights would have to be more subtle.
A conceivable problem with an economic incentive in this
context is that it may undermine the general purpose of public
interest programming, by producing a situation in which that
programming is confined to a small subset of stations—“cold
spots”—in a kind of communications equivalent, or converse, of the
“hot spot” problem that has received attention in the environmental
area.131 The “hot spots” problem arises when trades result in a
concentration of pollution in a single area, with serious adverse
health effects; it is generally agreed that steps must be taken to
130 See James Hamilton, Channeling Violence, supra, at 285-322 for an
instructive discussion.
131 See Stephen Breyer, Regulation and its Reform 175-78 (1982).
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ensure that this does not happen. In the communications context,
the problem will arise if all of the widely viewed broadcasters end up
selling their obligations to a single station or set of stations. This is
undesirable if it results in a kind of “ghettoization” of public interest
programming and if it is believed—as seems quite sensible—that all
or most viewers ought to have access to some public interest
programming.
A second problem is both conceptual and administrative. When
a trade is made, what is being traded? Perhaps it seems simplest, and
most sensible, to trade minutes for minutes. But all broadcast
minutes are not the same. An “internal” trade could be one in which
ABC (for example) trades an hour of prime-time programming for
an hour of 3 am programming; an external trade could involve a
transfer of one hour of ABC’s highly popular evening hours to (say)
Fox’s far less popular shows in the same period. Steps must be taken
to ensure that in any trade, there is an equal public interest benefit
for public interest loss. Perhaps a test of audience shares—“viewer
per viewer” trades—is the best way to start.
An approach of this kind would have the fortunate consequence
of helping to handle the “cold spots” problem as well. Part of the
problem can be handled by monitoring the sales to make sure that a
high-viewer broadcaster is trading to other high-viewer stations. If
the “minute for minute” trades were adjusted to take account of the
number of viewers, a trade to a low-viewer station would be
especially expensive. Demographic considerations could play a role as
well. The details are less important than the suggestion that a
creative administrative could reduce the relevant problems, just as
these have been handled in the environmental arena.
C. Economic Incentives and the Constitution
What is the relationship between economic incentives and the
first amendment? A direct tax on undesirable programming, or on
the failure to provide desirable programming, would raise very
constitutional questions. This is because they would be a regulation
of speech on the basis of content. Whether such a regulation would
be unconstitutional should turn on many of the questions raised in
debates over the legitimacy of the “fairness doctrine,” designed to
compel coverage of serious issues and an opportunity to speak for
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opposing views.132 Many people have argued that with decreasing
scarcity, the fairness doctrine is no longer legitimate if is ever was.133
If this objection is correct, an economic incentive in the form of a tax
would be questionable too. The advantage of a tax over the fairness
doctrine is that the former is far more flexible; hence if the fairness
doctrine would be constitutional under current conditions, the same
should be true of the proposed tax.
The point raises the question why, if a tax would be
constitutionally problematic, a system of “pay or play,” which has
similar motivations and consequences, would not be constitutionally
problematic as well. The intuition might be that a tax is a direct
penalty on a certain programming content, whereas “pay or play”
simply provides an alternative (“pay”) to a legitimate mandate. But
this seems to be a form of wordplay. If a tax is questionable, “pay or
play” should be questionable as well. My suggestion here is that there
should be no constitutional objection to the extent that government
is acting, in a viewpoint-neutral fashion, to promote educational
goals and attention to civic affairs. Current law gives no clear answer
to that question.134 For those who believe that government is
prohibited from favoring programming of a particular content, “pay
or play” should be unacceptable. The problem with this view is that
it seems to convert the first amendment into a species of Herbert
Spencer’s Social Statics, in a way that loosens the connection
between the free speech principle and underlying democratic goals. If
the first amendment is associated with democratic self-government
and in particular with deliberative demoracy, “pay or play,” of the
sort suggested here, would be perfectly consistent with the free
speech guarantee.135
132

See Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 543 (DC Cir 1989) for an
outline of the issues.
133 This is the FCC’s current position. See id.
134 See Turner Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v. FCC, 520 US 180, 191 (1997)
(upholding “must carry” rules as effort to promote widespread dissemination of
information from a multiplicity of sources, but emphasizing that the rules are
content-neutral. For general discussion, see Cass R. Sunstein, One Case At A
Time 172-207 (1999).
135 I discuss the relationship between democratic goals and regulation of speech
in Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech 17-51 (1993).
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D. Expanding the Viewscreen: A Glance at the Cathedral
Thus far I have been exploring economic incentives by
contrasting taxes and tradeable rights with command-and-control
regulation. But if we wanted a more complete picture, we would
widen the viewscreen a bit. In a classic Article, Guido Calabresi and
A. Douglas Melamed proposed four “rules” that courts might adopt
for nuisance suits.136 Two of the rules come from a situation in
which either the plaintiff or the defendant is given the relevant
entitlement, and it is protected via a “property rule,” in which case
the entitlement could be reallocated only through a trade. The other
two rules come from a situation in which either is given an
entitlement protected by a “liability rule,” in which case the
entitlement could be reallocated through a legally forced exchange, at
a price determined through the legal system (assumed to be the
market price). Calabresi and Melamed also discuss “inalienability
rules,” in which no exchanges are permitted, either voluntarily or
through the legal system.
There is a great deal of room for exploring, through this lens,
the system of public interest regulation. If public interest
programming is desirable, and if certain programming is undesirable,
it may make sense to think of ways of requiring broadcasters to pay
“damages,” or instead to require the taxpaying public to pay for
better programming. A serious problem is of course one of valuation.
Suppose that certain programming (educational or civic, for
example) is a public good, producing positive externalities, and that
certain programming (violent material, for example) is a public bad,
producing negative externalities. How can government assign
monetary values to the desirable and undesirable effects? Is it
constitutional for government to do so? These questions are hard
enough in the area of torts; they are far harder in the context of
broadcasting. I restrict myself here to a comparison of some leading
alternatives.
Rule 1. Government requires all broadcasters to provide public
interest programming; no bargaining is allowed.

136 Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089 (1972).
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Comment: This is the traditional model, with the debate being
about its scope; thus the number of obligations was sharply
introduced in the 1980s, but without rethinking the basic model.
Under this system, the public’s interest in the relevant
programming137 is protected by an inalienable property rule. The
entitlement is granted to the government, and it is entitled to
mandate broadcaster performance. Thus broadcasters have a kind of
“split” property right; they own the right to broadcast as they choose
(in general), but the public has a kind of lien on the property, giving
it ownership rights over certain areas. Those who like the traditional
approach appear to think that it has good social consequences, by
ensuring that public interest programming is not relegated to
unpopular times and channels, and also that it has desirable
“expressive” effects, by affirming the status of broadcasters as public
trustees. As we have seen, it also has several possible problems; its
rigidity is likely to lead to inefficiency, and it may well produce
unintended adverse consequences, as in the case of the fairness
doctrine.
Rule 2a. Government requires broadcasters who do not provide
public interest programming to pay a kind of “damage award,” to be
determined by government and then used to fund public interest
programming by others, such as PBS..
Comment: Under this approach, the public continues to have
the relevant entitlement, which is protected by an unusual liability
rule. The broadcasters’ failure to provide educational programming
for children, or free air time for candidates, would count as a kind of
social harm for which broadcasters would have to pay. (The same
might be said of the provision of violent or sexually explicit
programming, though here the first amendment problems would be
quite serious.) One problem with this approach is the need to
calculate the level of the “damage award.” There are no clear market
measures for this amount, which will therefore have a level of
arbitrariness.
Rule 2b. Government requires each broadcaster to provide a certain
level public interest programming, but permits broadcasters to sell their
137 I am so describing it for convenience, without making any normative
judgment.
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obligations (accompanied by money) to others, at a market-determined
rate.
Comment: This is akin to 2a, in the sense that the public has
the relevant entitlement, which protected by a kind of liability rule;
but here the market, rather than the legal system, determines the
value of not playing the public interest programming. Hence one
station might sell to another its obligation to provide, say, one hour
of educational programming; the selling station would pay the
market-determined amount to ensure that the buying station will
find it worthwhile to take on the new duty. This kind of market
determination could be a substantial advantage in light of limited
information on the government’s part; government is an extremely
poor position to calculate any such “damage award.”
As compared with Rule 1, a potential problem with this
approach is that some people may avoid the stations that “play” and
may not see the relevant programming at all. On the other hand, the
empirical question remains whether under Rule 1, most members of
the viewing audience will see and benefit from the mandated
programming.
Rule 2c: Government establishes a minimum total content of public
interest broadcasting on broadcast networks each year (for example, six
hours of free air time for candidates, 150 hours of educational
programming for children), assigns initial, pro rate obligations to each
broadcaster, and then permits broadcasters to trade the obligations at
market-determined prices.
Comment: This is very close to 2b; the only difference is that it
is a precise analogy to certain initiatives in environmental law, where
government establishes a maximum level of pollution in the relevant
area, provides pollution permits, and then allows trades among
polluters.138 A disadvantage of this approach, as compared to 2a, is
that it may be harder to calculate the total level of appropriate
program than to decide on the appropriate for tax for those who do
not play. On the other hand, the opposite may be true.139 An
138 This is the acid deposition program under the Clean Air Acr, 42 U.S.C.7651
et seq.
139 These are brief notes on a complex issue. For details in the environmental
context, see Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation:
Instrument Choice in the Legal Context, 108 Yale LJ 677, 706-35 (1999).
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additional difficulty, as discussed above, is that broadcasting hours
are not fungible. An hour of children’s programming at 3 am on
Monday morning is a lot less valuable than at 9 am on Saturday.
Rule 3a. Government pays broadcasters (at reasonable but
government-determined rates) to provide public interest programming.
Comment: Under this approach, the broadcasters have the
relevant entitlement, which is protected by a liability rule. The
broadcaster owns the entitlement, but the government is permitted
to obtain a forced exchange, just as it is in the general law of eminent
domain. In fact it is possible to see some kind of payment as the
constitutionally compelled solution, at least if the right to provide
such programming as broadcasters choose is taken to be, by
constitutional decree, an entitlement in broadcasters. Thus, for
example, government might be able to compel coverage of important
issues, or attention to the needs of children, or programming
involving emergencies; but the public has to pay.
Interestingly, government appears not to have tried this
approach in the United States, at least not as a general rule. An
advantage of this approach is that it should not be difficult to
calculate the value of the exchange; the market will answer that
question. This is an important advantage over Rule 2a. On the other
hand, Rule 3a has probably been resisted, as compared with 1, 2a,
and 2b, on the ground that because broadcasters are beneficiaries of
public largesse, they should not be paid to promote public interest
goals. This is of course a distributional concern, and the underlying
judgment—that “broadcasters,” rather than “taxpayers,” should
pay—is not clearly correct in light of the complexity of the incidence
of the burden imposed under 1 and 2a or 2b. The burden under the
latter rules does not simply fall on “broadcasters” but more likely on
advertisers and hence on consumers—perhaps to the benefit of those
who advertise in newspapers and on cable. Rule 3a might be
preferable if it is amended as suggested in Rule 5a, which would
require broadcasters to buy spectrum rights.
A serious problem with this kind of system is that it may
provide broadcasters with an incentive to produce less public interest
broadcasting on their own than they otherwise would, or at least to
understate the amount that they would voluntarily provide. In an
unrestricted market, political and shareholder pressures, conscience,
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and advertiser and viewer demand will result in a nontrivial amount
of public interest programming.140 But if government proposes to
pay broadcasters for whatever public interest programming they
provide, voluntary service may be substantially reduced. This is a
pervasive problem with paying people to do good, or not to do bad;
the payment may induce less of the good or more of the bad.141 The
question for rule 3 is whether it is possible to generate a “baseline
production” level from which any subsidy could be calculated.
Rule 3b. Government must—and does—buy the right to ensure
public interest programming, at market-determined rates
Comment: This is a variation on 3a in the sense that it
transforms the broadcasters’ entitlement into one protected by a
property rule. It is akin to a system of markets in broadcasting, but
with two qualifications: broadcasters are not required to pay for their
entitlement in the first instance, and government stands ready to
compete with others who seek to obtain access to viewers. One
advantage of 3b over 3a is that it operates on the basis of marketdetermined prices; no one has to calculate a special government rate.
But if one believes that existing fare is unproblematic, the
government’s purchases will be wasteful. And those committed to
public interest programming may object that government will not
purchase enough (unless this is specified in some way in advance);
they may also object that so long as licenses are being given for free,
other rules, not given a “windfall” to broadcasters, are better.
Rule 4. Broadcasters provide such public interest broadcasting as they
choose, including none at all.
Comment: On this approach, the broadcasters’ interest is
protected by a property rule. Broadcasters own the relevant
entitlement. Just as occurs in an ordinary market, people can pay
broadcasters to provide public interest programming, at market
determined prices. The problem with this approach is that the
market price might be too high, for all of the reasons discussed in
Part IB of this Article. This approach is similar to Rule 3b, except
that government does not stand ready to ensure a certain level of
public interesting programming.
140 See National Association of Broadcasters, supra note.
141 See Saul Levmore, Carrots and Torts (unpublished manuscript 1999).
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Rule 5a. Broadcasters must buy, via auction, the right to broadcast,
and once they do that, they can provide such public interest broadcasting as
they choose, including none at all.
Comment: This is a kind of ideal market solution. It does not
involve a governmental “giveaway” of a scarce resource, and after the
valuable commodity has been purchased, free trades are allowed. It
seems to have all the advantages of Rule 4, with the further
advantage that the valuable property right is purchased rather than
simply conferred. The problems with this approach should be easy to
identify from section IB of this Article.
Rule 5b. Broadcasters must buy, via auction, the right to broadcast,
but once they do that, they may be asked or (if for some reason necessary)
compelled to provide public interest broadcasting at market-determined
prices.
Comment: This is quite similar to 5a. The difference is that
government stands ready to pay for public interest programming on
broadcast stations, at market prices; and if broadcasters for some
reason refuse, government can force an exchange. Under 5b, part of
the entitlement is owned, but protected only by a liability rule. This
approach is in one sense a cousin of 2b. The major difference is that
here the taxpayers are paying for public interest programming (at the
same time that they receive money from the sale of the spectrum),
rather than “broadcasters.” The most important difference is
therefore distributional. As noted above, that difference is more
complex than it seems in light of the fact that when a burden is
imposed on “broadcasters,” their advertisers are likely to be paying
much of the bill, and the result will be complex effects on consumers,
on other communications outlets, and on advertising choices. There
is no simple redistribution, in 2b, from “broadcasters” to the “public.”
Rule 5c: Broadcasters must buy, via auction, the right to broadcast;
once they do that, they may be subject to public interest obligations, but
they can pay a “damage award,” to be used by some other station to support
public interest programming, if they fail to do so.
Comment: This should also decrease the amount paid for the
entitlement, as compared with Rule 5a. This is a pay or play version
of Rules 5a and 5b. The problem here lies in determining the level of
any such “damage award.” This approach is in one sense a cousin of
Rule 2a, as pay or play systems.
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A full understanding of these possibilities would much facilitate
both conceptual and empirical inquiry. Undoubtedly a choice among
the various options should depend partly on the particular public
interest obligation involved; a requirement of emergency warnings
might take the form of Rule 1, whereas a requirement of free air
time for candidates might be some combination of Rules 1, 2b, and
5b. The analysis thus far suggests that Rules 2b and 5b have special
advantages over the alternatives. Rule 2b, the basic pay or play
system, seems well-suited to the current period, as a kind of interim
improvement over the regulatory status quo. In some areas, Rule 5b
may well be better in the longer term, as broadcasters come to
resemble general-interest magazines. Movement in the direction of
selling the spectrum, rather than giving it away to preselected
owners, would also be highly desirable.
VI. Voluntary Self-Regulation:
Aspirations, Trustees, and “Winner-Take-Less” Codes
In this section I discuss the possibility of promoting public
interest goals through voluntary self-regulation, as through a “code”
of conduct to be issued and enforced by the National Association of
Broadcasters (NAB). For many decades, in fact, the NAB did indeed
impose a code, partly to promote its economic interests (by raising
the price of advertising), partly to fend off regulation (by showing
that the industry was engaged in self-regulation), and partly to carry
out the moral commitments of broadcasters themselves. A code has a
great deal of potential. Above all, it could address a far greater
number of problems than an economic incentive (for first
amendment reasons), and it appears to have far more potential for
producing good, and reducing bad, than a disclosure requirement.
For example, a code could address all public interest obligations
thus far, but also attempt to protect against sexually violent material,
against subliminal advertising, against sensationalistic treatment of
politics, and against a wide range of other problems with television.
The question is whether it is possible, in the current era, for
broadcasters to overcome some of the unfortunate effects of the
marketplace with voluntary measures. An underlying question, likely
to be faced in many areas of regulatory policy both domestically and
internationally, is whether a code would work as a kind of
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undesirable cartelization or instead as protection against an
undesirable “race to the bottom.” I suggest that a code might do a
great deal of good, partly because of the likely existence of external
monitors, partly because of a code’s capacity to help develop a kind
of internal morality likely to affect many of its signatories. A general
lesson is that the antitrust laws ought not to be invoked too readily
to prevent producers from undertaking cooperative action in
circumstances in which competition is producing palpable social
harms. In such contexts, a “code” can provide some of advantages of
government regulation, but do so in a more flexible and betterinformed fashion. Thus it is hazardous to invoke the antitrust laws to
prevent an industry to provide the kinds of benefits that might be
provided, more crudely and expensively, by direct regulation.142
A. The Problem and A Recently Emerging Strategy
Notwithstanding the qualifications described above, competitive
pressures often can do a great deal in providing programming that
people would like to see. In an era of cable television, and an
increasingly large range of options, competitive pressures will be
especially in producing “niche” programming for people who have a
particular interest in serious programming. The communications
market increasingly resembles the market for magazines; recall the
possibility, in a digital market, of over one thousand stations. But
those competitive pressures also have a downside. They can lead to
sensationalistic, prurient, or violent programming, and to a failure to
provide sufficient attention to educational values, or to the kind of
programming that is indispensable to a well-functioning
democracy.143 This is so especially in light of the fact that a small
relative advantage can led to huge increases in viewers, a fact that
presses television in tabloid-like directions. As Robert Frank and
Philip Cook have suggested, “[I]ncreasingly impoverished political
debate is yet another cost of our current cultural trajectory. Complex
modern societies generate complex economic and social problems,
and the task of choosing the best course is difficult under the best of
142 See Robert Frank and Philip Cook, The Winner-Take-All Society 225-27
(1995).
143 See James P. Hamilton, Channeling Violence: The Economic Market for
Violent Television Programming, supra, at 129-284 (discussing violence)..
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circumstances. And yet, as in-depth analysis and commentary give
way to sound bites in which rival journalists and politicians
mercilessly ravage one another, we become an increasingly illinformed and ill-tempered electorate.”144
It would be possible to respond to the harmful effects of
competitive pressures in various ways. Probably the simplest response
would take the form of voluntary self-regulation, through some kind
of “code” of good programming; this approach is specifically
designed to respond to the problems that can be introduced by
market pressures. In various nations, including the United States,
cooperative action has played a constructive role in situations of this
kind.145 Though it has yet to receive much academic commentary,146
voluntary self-regulation via industry agreements is emerging as a
regulatory strategy of choice, especially in the environmental
arena.147 The EPA, for example, has encouraged companies that
produce pesticides to agree on pesticide reduction strategies, and
here the fact of broad agreement is crucial.148 California has
attempted to deal with the problem of workplace accidents via a
“cooperative compliance program” involving self-enforced safety
plans on large construction projects. The result has been to produce
significant drops in accident rates.149 Self-regulating agreements are
now in place in Canada’s system for forest management; in the
Responsible Care program of the chemical industry, now operating
in more than forty countries; in national regulation of nuclear power
plants.150
144 See Robert H. Frank and Philip J. Cook, The Winner-Take-All Society 203
(1995).
145 See the discussion of ethical code in Israel in Moshe Negbi, The Enemy
Within 14 (Joan Shorenstein Center, Harvard University, Discussion paper D35, November 1998). Note also that many international bodies attempt to certify
quality, in a kind of cooperative action designed to reduce adverse effects of
market pressures.
146 An exception is Neil Gunningham and Joseph Rees, Industry SelfRegulation: An Institutional Perspective, 19 Law & Policy 363 (1997).
147 See Gunningham and Graboski, supra, at 50-56, 300-07.
148 Id. at 300.
149 See Gunningham and Rees, supra, at 369.
150 Id. at 51.
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What accounts for the increasing popularity of industry selfregulation, as part of the general project of “reinventing
government”151? From the industry’s standpoint, self-regulation
allows far more flexibility than government mandates. From the
standpoint of government itself, a special advantage of codes is that
they avoid the kind of informational overload that comes from
government prescriptions; it is partly for this reason that voluntary
agreements among companies have had good effects in the area of
occupational safety and health.152 In a point of special relevance to
television, codes also have been found to have the “ability to
influence community attitudes,” in a way that tends to contribute to
the “development of a custodial ethic.”153 Thus codes have helped to
develop “an effective institutional morality that brings the behavior
of industry members within a normative framework.”154
Such cooperative action often makes people concerned about
antitrust violations and self-interested profit-seeking under a publicspirited guise. This is of course a risk, but the antitrust law can go
wrong when it prevents certain cooperative action that overcomes
palpably adverse effects of market pressures. Indeed, the
International Standards Organization is designed specifically to
ensure a form of cooperation designed to overcome those adverse
effects155; the question is whether that experience has
communications analogues.
151

See symposium, Industry Self-Regulation, 19 Law and Policy 300 (1997).
152 See J.V. Rees, Reforming the Workplace: A Study of Self-Regulation in
Occupational Safety and Health (1988); John Mendenhall, Regulating
Occupational Safety and Health (1989).
153 Id.
154 See Gunningham and Rees, supra, at 371-72.
155 See, e.g., Profit Bows to Ethics, Independent (London), Oct. 26, 1997,
Sunday, at 3.(stating “Some of the world’s biggest companies are putting their
weight behind a new, verifiable code of conduct intended to answer mounting
consumer criticism of the exploitative conditions under which the goods they sell
are produced in poor countries. . . . The code, called SA8000 (Social
Accountability 8000), is the brainchild of the Council on Economic Priorities, an
American public interest group, which tries to improve corporate responsibility. It
has been drawn up by companies, non-governmental organisations, trade unions,
and other interested groups, and is due to start operating next year. The code
covers the basic issues of child labour, forced labour, health and safety, trade
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My emphasis here is on allowing programmers and journalists
to do what, in an important sense, they would actually prefer to do.
It is worth underlining this point. Many journalists in the world of
broadcasting would very much like to do better156; competitive
pressures are the problem, not the solution, and a voluntary code
could help them and the public as well.
B. History
The idea of a broadcasting code is nothing new. Consider its
development over time:157
1. Origins and precursors: The spectrum and Roosevelt
The idea of a broadcasting “code” has a long history. The NAB
was founded in 1923, and it first attempted to produce a degree of
self-regulation in 1926, as a response to the “chaos” widely perceived
to have been produced by interference and piracy. Some progress was
made, but ultimately the agreement broke down; hence legislation
was necessary, in the form of the Radio Act of 1927.
The initial NAB code was produced in 1928. It included some
content guidance, but it was quite vague and also lacked an
enforcement mechanism. Just one year later the NAB adopted a new
code, involving ethics and standards of commercial practice. For
example, the code banned “fraudulent, deceptive or obscene”
material, “false, deceptive, or grossly exaggerated advertising claims,
and “offensive” material. But the continuing imprecision of this

union rights, discrimination, discipline, working hours, and pay. . . . As the name
SA8000 suggests, it is the first to be modelled on existing and widely accepted
commercial standards such as IS09000, drawn up by the International Standards
Organization in Geneva, which is used to determine whether companies have the
management systems to meet required product quality. But the real strength of
the new approach is commercial sanctions. A company which adopts the code
also agrees to be independently inspected to see whether it is abiding by the
conditions laid down. It will be able to attract customers and gain a competitive
advantage by advertising the fact that its factories and suppliers meet the
standard.”
156 See Schechter, supra note.
157 I draw here on Mark M. MacCarthy, Broadcast Self-Regulation: The NAB
Codes, Family Viewing Hour, and Television Violence, 13 Cardozo Arts & Ent.
L.J. 667 (1995).
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code, together with the lack of an effective enforcement mechanism,
made it something of limited usefulness.
The next major step resulted from President Roosevelt’s
National Recovery Administrative Codes in 1933. The NAB
submitted a code of fair practices to the NRA, and on November 27,
1933, President Roosevelt signed it and gave it the force of law. The
result included a seven-person Broadcaster Code Authority,
designed to supervise compliance. But the National Recovery Act
was struck down in 1935 by the Supreme Court, and the Code
Authority was eliminated along with the “law” that President
Roosevelt had signed.
2. After the New Deal, and increased content control
Soon thereafter the NAB produced a new voluntary code, which
was largely ignored. But in 1938 the NAB produced another, more
specific code and also an explicit enforcement authority, the NAB
Code Committee. Part of the reason for the new development was
the increasing willingness of the FCC to regulate both structure and
content—and a specific warning, by the Chairman of the FCC (after
the broadcast of War of the Worlds) that without industry selfpolicing, government involvement was likely.
The 1938 code included a number of important provisions.
Among other things, it (a) required broadcasters to allot time fairly
for discussion of controversial views; (b) banned the sale of time for
the airing of controversial views; (c) asked broadcasters to cooperate
with educational groups for the airing of educational programming;
(d) required fair and accurate news programs; and (e) regulated
commercials by limiting the time and length of advertisements.
There were also prohibitions on hard liquor advertising. A code
committee would enforce the Code by determining whether a station
was in compliance. Notably, the head of the FCC publicly approved
the code, and the American Civil Liberties Union described it as “a
great step forward in formulating a policy in the public interest.”
3. Television.
All of these steps involved radio, but the 1938 code was the
unmistakable precursor of the eventual television code. In its first
period, television witnessed a pattern that generally characterized the
past debates over radio and late twentieth century debates over
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television: legislative concern, proposed legislation, steps toward selfregulation, and little or no legislation or regulation.
In 1951, members of Congress proposed a National Citizens
Advisory Board for Radio and Television, to oversee programming
content. At about the same time the NAB began to draft its first
television code in 1952, apparently in direct response to a
congressional threat of legislation.158 The new code had a broad
reach, emphasizing in particular educational and cultural
programming. It also contained content restrictions on display of
violent action and sexual material.
Compliance with the Code was voluntary. (Note also that
station operators who were not members of the NAB were eligible to
subscribe.) Its enforcement provisions were quite modest. The basic
mechanism came in the form of a clearinghouse for complaints. In
addition, subscribers could display a code seal (the NAB “Seal of
Good Practice”), and permission to display the seal would be
withdrawn for “continuing, willful, or gross” violations. Thus the
only formal sanction was that the noncomplying station owner could
not display the seal. But there were informal pressures too. Stations
who sought license renewal were likely to have prompt FCC
processing if they adhered to the code. Moreover, some people
believe that subscription to the Code was appealing to those who
bought advertising time, because the Code contained limits on the
length and frequency of commercials, which would enhance the
prominence of the announcement. Some stations in the United
States did not adhere to the Code, but the vast majority chose to do
so.
4. Family viewing
In 1962, the FCC proposed to make parts of the code into a
legal mandate. The industry successfully resisted this step. But there
was a continuing pattern of interaction among regulatory proposals,
legislative reaction, public concern, and self-regulation. Of these the
most important involved 1970s concerns about violence on
television. The industry responded through the “family viewing
policy,” saying that inappropriate entertainment programming would
158 See Daniel L. Brenner, The Limits of Broadcast Self-Regulation Under the
First Amendment, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 1527, 1529 (1975).

Chicago Law and Economics Working Paper

56

not be shown between 7 pm and 9 pm eastern standard time. This
was a distinctive form of self-regulation. But the Writers Guild of
America challenged the policy on first amendment grounds (see
below), arguing that the policy was not voluntary self-regulation but
was in fact a produce of government coercion.
In a controversial decision, the trial court accepted the
challenge, and barred the NAB from enforcing the policy.159 The
court of appeals overturned the decision on the ground that the
district court was not the right forum to resolve these issues in the
first instance.160 The court of appeals said that the issue should first
be resolved by the FCC. Although the decision of the court of
appeals was jurisdictional, that court suggested considerable doubt
about the district court’s judgment: “It simply is not true that the
First Amendment bars all limitations of the power of the individual
licensee to determine what he will transmit to the listening and
viewing public.” 161
The FCC ruled in 1983 that there had been no government
coercion and that the NAB had adopted the family viewing policy
voluntarily. In its key passage the FCC wrote, “[v]oluntary industry
action is often preferable to governmental solutions, and an industry
frequently addresses a problem in order to forestall regulation by the
Government; conversely, it is not unusual for a regulatory body to
forego enacting rules when the regulated industry voluntarily adopts
standards which deal with a perceived problem.”162 In June 1979,
however, the Justice Department filed the antitrust suit described in
detail below, resulting in the demise of the television code.
In the 1980s, continuing congressional concern about televised
violence led to a new law exempting from the antitrust law networks,
broadcasters, cable operators and programmers, and trade
association, in order to permit them to generate standards to reduce
159 Writers Guild of Am. West v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064 (C.D. Cal. 1976),
vacated sub nom. Writers Guild of Am., West v. American Broadcasting Co.,
609 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980).
160 Writers Guild of Am., West v. American Broadcasting Co., 609 F.2d 355
(9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980).
161 609 F.2d at 364.
162 NAB Television Code, Report, 95 F.C.C.2d 700, 710 (1983).
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the amount of violence on television.163 But there was considerable
doubt about whether an explicit exemption was necessary; a 1993
opinion from the Department of Justice said that the industry could
cooperate to reduce television violence without offense to the law of
antitrust.164
In June 1990 the NAB issued new, quite tepid “voluntary
programming principles” to cover violence, indecency and obscenity,
drugs and substance abuse, and violence. The new standards were
reaffirmed in June 1991, and in 1992, ABC, NBC, and CBS issued
and agreed to adhere to a set of new standards, although without an
enforcement mechanism. Thus in the 1990s self-regulation can be
found in various places: the advance parental advisory system, joint
advisory guidelines issued by the four networks, NAB principles, and
an annual public assessment, by the four networks, of television
violence.
C. A Code: Sample Provisions
The question is whether it might be possible to adopt a new
code for broadcasting, specifically designed for the new
communications market. Such a code might update the old NAB
code, and help overcome current problems, without having the
degree of tepidness of the existing “standards.” A code might even
promote some of the goals associated with deliberative democracy.
What provisions might a new code include? An important
question involves appropriate specificity; quite clear provisions
(“three hours of educational programming per week”) risk excessive
rigidity, whereas vague provisions (“reasonable efforts to provide
educational programming per children”) risk meaninglessness.
Discussions of code-making in general have stressed the need for
“the public announcement of the principles and practices that the
industry presumptively accepts as a guide to appropriate conduct and
also as a basis fo evaluating and criticizing performance.”165 This
point argues in favor of a degree of specificity.
163 See 47 U.S.C. § 303(c).
164 See Letter from Sheila Anthony, Assistant Attorney General for Legislative
Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice, to Sen. Paul Simon (D-Ill.) (Nov. 29, 1993).
165 See Gunningham and Rees, supra, at 383.
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Consider the following possible code provisions,166 simply for
the sake of illustration:
1. Each broadcaster shall provide three hours of free air time
for candidates during the two month period preceding the
election. In return for free air time, candidates shall discuss
substantive issues in a substantive way, and must provide
something other than short “soundbites.”
2. Each broadcaster shall provide one hour of educational
programming for children each day. Broadcasters shall attempt
to ensure that children are not exposed to excessively violent
programming or programming that is otherwise harmful to or
inappropriate for children. Broadcasters shall avoid
programming that encourages criminal or self-destructive
behavior; they should also be sensitive in presenting sexual
material that children might encounter.
3. News coverage shall be substantive and issue-oriented. It
should not emphasize the sensational and the prurient. It
should concern itself with claims and disagreements on matters
of substance. Consistent with the exercise of legitimate station
discretion, stations should not give excessive or undue attention
to sensational accusations or to issues of “who is ahead,” at the
expense of other issues.
4. Morbid, sensationalistic or alarming details not essential to a
factual report, especially in connection with stories of crime or
sex, should be avoided. News should be broadcast in such a
manner as to avoid panic and unnecessary alarm. News
programming should attempt to avoid prurience,
sensationalism, and gossip. Stations should make an effort to

166 These provisions are adapted but substantially revised from the more detailed
Code suggested by the Report of the Advisory Committee, supra note. I believe
that the provisions described there are too vague and tepid to be useful; for
reasons discussed in the text, vague and tepid provisons create a high probability
of futility and ineffectiveness.
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devote enough time to public issues to permit genuine
understanding of problems and disagreements.
5. Violence, psychological but especially physical, should be
portrayed responsibly, and not exploitatively. Presentation of
violence should avoid the excessive, the gratuitous, the
humiliating, and the instructional. The use of violence for its
own sake and the detailed dwelling upon brutality or physical
agony, by sight or sound, should be avoided. Programs
involving violence should venture to present the consequences
to its victims and perpetrators. Particular care should be
exercised where children may see, or are involved in, the
depiction of violent behavior.. Programs should not present
rape, sexual assault, or sexual violence in an attractive or
exploitative light.
6. Broadcasters shall ensure that their programming is
responsive to the needs of citizens with disabilities. To this
end, broadcasters shall ensure that programming is accessible,
through the provision of closed captioning and other means, to
the extent that doing so does not impose an undue burden on
the broadcaster. Particular efforts should be made to provide
full access to news and public affairs programming. Citizens
who are deaf and hard of hearing are sometimes at risk of a
form of disenfranchisement., or even physical danger, because
steps are not taken to ensure that television broadcasting is
available to them. Stations should take special steps to ensure
that information about disasters and emergencies are fully
accessible to those who are deaf and hard of hearing, including
in “real time.”

D. A Code: Problems and Prospects
Such a code would of course raise many questions. The first
would involve the problem of enforcement. Without an enforcement
mechanism, a code might have no effect at all, indeed it might be a
form of public deception.167
167 See John Braithwaite, Responsive Business Regulatory Institutions, in
Business, Ethics, and Law 91 (C. Cody and C. Sampford eds. 1993).

Chicago Law and Economics Working Paper

60

There are several obvious possibilities. The simplest would be
for the NAB to undertake enforcement on its own, just as it did
under the old code. It might, for example, give a seal of approval to
those who are shown to comply with its provisions, and deny a seal
of approval to those who have been shown not to have complied.
The NAB might also give special public recognition to those stations
that have compiled an excellent public service record in the past year.
Such recognition may be awarded for, among other things, meeting
the needs of children in a sustained and creative way, offering
substantive and extended coverage of elections, including interviews,
free air time, and debates, offering substantive and extended coverage
of public issues, and providing opportunities for discussion of
problems facing the local community. At the time of license renewal,
a notation might be given to the FCC that there has been
compliance or continuing or egregious noncompliance with the code.
If the NAB is unwilling to enforce a code of this kind, perhaps a
private group could take the initiative, both promulgating the code
and publicizing and in that (modest) sense sanctioning violations.168
A special problem here is that in light of increasing competition
from non-broadcast programming sources, a code would not be in
the economic interest of broadcasters even if generally adopted, and
this is an unpromising fact for a code’s effectiveness.169 Perhaps
supplemental enforcement will come from rivals of those who defect
from the agreement and violate the code; this is a reasonable
prediction in theory, and something similar has been found in
analogous areas.170
Any enforcement by the NAB or even a private monitoring
group would be most likely to succeed if accompanied by external
pressures of one sort or another. As in the case of disclosure
requirements, the most promising possibilities include public interest
groups able to mobilize relevant social norms and to focus media
168

This approach would have special advantages in light of the fact that some
stations are not members of the NAB. For NAB stations that must compete with
non-member stations, a code creates an obvious competitive risk, and there is a
continuing question whether it is possible to design strategies, public or private,
to combat this risk.
169 See Gunningham and Grabosky, supra note, at 53-54.
170 See Gunningham and Rees, supra note, at 403.
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attention on derelict actors.171 Perhaps such activity would be
accompanied by market pressures of various sorts, as consumer
action has had significant effects on code enforcement in related
areas.172 A degree of FCC interest in the existence of code violations
would also help.
These points raise a related question: the scope of any such
code. Undoubtedly such a code was less painful, and easier to
operate, when three broadcasters exhausted the universe of
television. Of course broadcasters now find themselves in
competition with many other entertainment sources, including cable
and the Internet. In these circumstances, broadcasters are not likely
to constrain themselves if their competitors are not similarly
constrained. The competition for an audience for news is much
affected by the existence of “tabloid television,” and a broadcaster
who ties himself to the mast may find himself with a significantly
reduced audience. The point suggests that in the development of a
code, broadcasters should perhaps be joined by the National
Association of Cable Television. By itself, however, a code limited to
broadcasters should do considerable good, even if some broadcasters
are reluctant to subscribe to it. When the market reaches the stage in
which broadcasters are merely some of a large number of providers,
with no distinctive status, it might make sense to think of a more
general code (with suitable adjustments for particular kinds of
programmers173). It is worth underlining the point that as in the
context of disclosure, the likelihood of success will increase with the
existence of third-party monitors, both public and private, and also
with a threat of more intrusive action should it prove necessary.174
E. Notes on Antitrust Law and the First Amendment
A code for television broadcasters might be thought to raise
issues of both constitutional and antitrust law. The constitutional
issues are relatively straightforward; the antitrust issues are a bit more
complex. I offer a brief discussion here.
171 See Gunningham and Rees, supra, at 390-92.
172 See id. at 391 (discussing hostile consumer action).
173 For example, it is not clear that a station devoted to children should be
required to provide free air time for political candidates.
174 See Gunningham and Grabosky, supra note, at 55-56.
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There is essentially no risk that a code of the sort suggested here
would create serious first amendment problems. By itself, a code is a
private set of guidelines, and private guidelines by themselves raise
no first amendment issue. If a private group decides to impose
restrictions on the speech of its members, and government is not
involved, the first amendment is irrelevant Of course things would
be different if government mandated any such code.175
Nor would provisions like those described above be likely to
violate the antitrust laws. The Department of Justice has so
concluded,176 and in two important cases, aspects of previous codes
were upheld against private antitrust attack. A district court refused
to issue an injunction against code standards forbidding cigarette
advertising, despite a claim that these standards were inconsistent
with the antitrust laws.177 A lower court also upheld the provisions
involving standards for advertising for children.178 In these cases, the
175 See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (private contract raises
no first amendment issue); San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States
Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830
(1982). If a code is a product of government threat, and is effectively required by
government, the first amendment comes into play. See Writers Guild of
America, supra. There can be no question that a governmentally mandated code,
not voluntary but taking the form that we have outlined, would raise legitimate
constitutional problems. This does not necessarily mean that the first amendment
would be violated; but it does mean that the code would have to be tested for
compliance with first amendment principles, including constitutional limits on
content regulation.
176 See note supra.
177 See American Brands, Inc. v. National Ass'n of Broadcasters, 308 F. Supp.
1166 (D.D.C. 1969). The court concluded that the plaintiff was not likely to
prevail on the merits. The court referred in particular to the dangers posed by
cigarette smoking and claimed that the standards and guidelines in the code serve
the “public interest.” Id. at 1169.
178 See American Fed’n of Television & Radio Artists v. National Ass’n of
Broadcasters, 407 F. Supp. 900 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) The rule at issue there said that
children’s program hosts or primary cartoon characters “shall not be utilized to
deliver commercial messages within or adjacent to the programs which feature
such hosts or cartoon characters.” The provision applied as well “to lead-ins to
commercials when such lead-ins contain sell copy or imply endorsement of the
product by program host or primary cartoon character.” The plaintiff attacked the
restrictions, claiming that it restricted the ability of hosts and actors to obtain free
employment for delivery of commercials. The court said, “There is not the
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court basically concluded that the restrictions were reasonable and in
the public interest.
As I have noted, the most recent code met its demise as a result
of an antitrust action brought by the Justice Department in 1979,
based on an allegation that certain provisions of the Code violated
the Sherman Act. But the Justice Department’s complaint was quite
narrow. It involved not the code in general, but three specific kinds
of cartel-like advertising restrictions: (1) time standards, limiting the
amount of commercial material that could be broadcast in an hour;
(2) program interruption standards, which imposed a limit on the
maximum number of commercial announcements per program as
well as on the number of consecutive announcements per
interruption; and (3) multiple product standards, which prohibited
the advertising of two or more products or services within a single
commercial if the commercial was less than 60 seconds in length.
Basically, the court held that the multiple product standards were per
se unlawful, but that the time standards and program interruption
standards could not be tested without an inquiry into the facts. 179
slightest indication of any anti-competitive purpose in the creation of the rule,”
especially since there was no evidence of a motive ““to benefit one class of
performers competitively over another class of performers.” Id. at 902. The court
found it relevant that the rule “resulted from a bona fide concern on the part of
various groups, and the FCC, regarding fair and ethical methods to be used in
television advertising directed to children.” Id. This was “a reasonable rule of
conduct regarding good practice by its members in the public interest and is not
in violation of the antitrust laws.” Id. at 903.
179The district court held that the time and product interruption standards were
not invalid per se. In the court’s view, the distinctive characteristics of the
broadcasting industry argued against a per se rule of invalidity. Because broadcast
frequencies are scarce, because the whole area is subject to regulation, and because
of the fact that there are only sixty minutes in an hour (!), no simple solution
would be sensible. On these two issues, the court also denied summary judgment
for the government under the rule of reason, concluding that there were material
issues of fact. By contrast, the court held that the multiproduct standard was per
se unlawful. In its view, this rule was akin to a standardization agreement by
which food manufacturers set a standard for the ingredients that would be used in
their products. This form of standardization was per se illegitimate. Thus the
court actually invalidated only one provision of the code, on the theory that it was
analytically akin to a system for price-fixing. At the same time, the court denied
summary judgment for the NAB. An important question was whether the time
standards would have the effect of raising or stabilizing the price of commercial
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After the court’s ruling, the NAB suspended enforcement of all
code provisions.180 Doubtless the NAB did this partly for reasons of
economic self-interest, and not only because it was fearful of a legal
challenge. Nonetheless, the district court’s narrow
decision—untested in any court of appeals—has loomed over the
debate about codes. But in its most recent analysis of the problem,
the Department of Justice suggested that networks could agree to
guidelines and principles to reduce unnecessary violence on
television.181 Indeed, this is not an ordinary form of collusion. It is
not as if broadcasters are saying that advertisers must pay a minimum
of $X per advertisement. It is possible that the restrictions under
discussion would have little or no adverse effect on competition; they
may even have good effects on competition.182 Even with a code,
programmers would compete over a great many things, including the
kinds of programming regulated by a code. The code might in a
sense be procompetitive, because it would ensure television coverage
of materials in which there is a substantial public interest and which
might otherwise not be provided. This is so especially in light of the
time (this was the antitrust problem); it was possible, the court said, that any such
effect would be trivial in light of the importance of other factors. If this was true,
the code would not violate the Sherman Act. This is because there is no antitrust
violation without a significant adverse effect on competition. See, e.g., United
States v. Arnold, Schwinn, & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 375 (1967), overruled on other
grounds by Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. 433 U.S. 36 (1977);
Neeld v. National Hockey League, 594 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1979).
180 In public it claimed that it would seek an appeal, but a consent judgment was
issued, in which the NAB agreed, for ten years, to cease monitoring and
enforcement of the three disputed code provisions.
181 See Letter Of Sheila Anthony, Assistant Attorney General, supra. The
Department of Justice concluded that “the conduct that was at issue in the NAB
case differs significantly from that covered by” an agreement on televised violence.
Id. at 3. In the NAB case, the problem was raising “the price of time,” to “the
detriment of both advertisers and the ultimate consumers of the products
promoted on the air.” Id. By contrast, an agreement covering violence should “be
liked to traditional industry standard-setting efforts that do not necessarily
restrain competition and may have significant procompetitive benefits.” Id. In the
view of the Department of Justice, “efforts to develop and disseminate voluntary
guidelines to reduce the negative impact of television violence should fare well
under the appropriate rule-of-reason antitrist analysis.” Id. at 4.
182 Compare Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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fact that stations would compete for viewers with respect to the
kinds of programming covered by the code.183
In light of the distinctive nature of the television market, a code
of the sort under discussion would likely survive a “rule of reason”
inquiry. Any restrictions, such as they are, could be defended as a
means of promoting competition and also various public interest
goals, such as education of children, access for the handicapped, and
democratic and civic functions.184
F. Less Puzzling Puzzles
We are now in a position to disentangle the two puzzles
discussed in Part II. The broadcasters on the Committee favored a
code partly because they thought it a good idea in principle and
partly because they had little to lose from it. Though generally
“winners,” they were selected for the Committee because of their
commitment, through both words and deeds, to moderating some of
the adverse effects of competition. They were vulnerable to “winner
take all” effects insofar as they were reluctant to engage in certain
competitive practices. In this way, a code might even help them. But
the NAB would not like a code at all. The broadcasting industry as a
whole would be hurt by such a code, especially because cable
television would not be bound by it. Why should broadcasters, in an
intensely competitive market, give a significant edge to cable?
Especially if the result would be that cable could take, if not all, a lot
more of the viewing audience than it now does? It is not surprising if
183 It is not entirely clear that any plaintiff would have an antitrust injury. The
self-regulation that we are discussing would allow a wide range of choices and
options for consumers and producers. Perhaps some producer of some marginal
programming could claim that he was unable to sell his product because of (for
example) free air time for candidates; but this would be an extremely speculative
injury. Perhaps viewers could argue that they were deprived of certain
programming that they would like; but in view of the wide range of options
available to viewers, this too is speculative. Perhaps some stations or programmers
could contend that a code limited their freedom; but it is not clear that this would
count as an antitrust injury, especially in light of the fact that the code is
voluntary.
184 This idea is bolstered by the line of cases analyzing restrictions by trade
associations and similar entities. See, e.g., NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S.
85 (1984); Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, 486 U.S. 492 (1988).
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broadcasters who supply a large degree of public interest
programming believe that they would be net winners with a
code—and if the broadcasting industry as a whole believes that it
would be a net loser. Such an industry, cautious about invoking its
own economic interest alone, is all too likely to invoke the antitrust
laws (or the first amendment) for purely strategic and self-interested
reasons.
This point helps explain the Committee broadcasters’
skepticism about “pay or play” alternatives. A set of rigid public
interest requirements does not hurt them and may even help them,
insofar as it places their competitors under legal duties that they
would themselves meet voluntarily (because of their aspirations or
because of the particular demands of their audience and their
advertisers). A system of “pay or play” would mean that these
broadcasters would be undercut by competitors who, unwilling to
play, would pay—and capture a large audience share, in a version of
“winner-take-most.” But this is not a convincing objection to a
system of “pay or play.” It is true that some of those who “play” will
be at a competitive disadvantage with respect to some of those who
“pay” others to play instead. But by itself this competitive
disadvantage is not worthy of concern, any more than we should be
concerned when, in the environmental context, some of those who
reduce pollution are at a competitive disadvantage with respect to
those who, instead of reducing pollution, pay a substantial fee to
third parties who have reduced pollution, or to the treasury. The
question is what approach yields the best outcome for the public. If
there is too little public interest broadcasting, or too much pollution,
the solution is not the simple command to “play,” or “reduce,” but to
increase the price for failing to play or for failing to reduce.185
The best defense of a code of the sort I have discussed is that it
would produce “winner-take-less” outcomes, in a way that would
provide significant benefits for the public by diminishing some of the
adverse effects of market competition, and by strengthening
broadcaster norms in favor of obligations to children and to
democratic values. And if this is so, it provides a general lesson about
how voluntary private action might sometimes handle problems
185 With the qualification involving hot spots and cold spots, discussed above.
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usually dealt with by direct regulation—and a lesson about the
reflexive use of the antitrust laws to prevent producer cooperation.
VII. A Summary
The discussion has ranged over a number of regulatory tools,
and it may be helpful, by way of summary, to discuss them all briefly
and at once. We have seen that both disclosure and codes have the
advantage of ensuring a minimal government role, in a way that
reduces constitutional concerns and also allows a high degree of
flexibility. The danger is that these remedies will have little effect;
here the key question is whether there are good external monitors,
able to impose reputational or other costs on those who do poorly.
We have also seen that “taxes” on programming that does not serve
public interest goals, and subsidies to programming that does serve
such goals, can have similar effects. A principal problem with
subsidies is that they create an incentive not to provide such
programming voluntarily. The table that follows seems to capture
the basic territory.
Of course some of these tools could serve as complements rather
than as alternatives. Disclosure makes sense with or without
additional strategies. It should be the least controversial item on the
list; the only real question is what else should accompany it.
Disclosure is likely to work especially well in tandem with voluntary
self-regulation, indeed the two tools are natural allies. By contrast,
mandates and economic incentives are genuine competitors, and in
the current context, economic incentives generally seem best, with
mandates operating as a “backstop,” probably to be eliminated in the
long term.186
As I have emphasized, these recommendations are designed for
the current stage of telecommunications technology; they are also
likely to make sense for the near term. For the next decade, the key
question is whether initiatives designed for broadcasters should be
applied to cable programmers as well (especially disclosure and
compliance with a code).

186 For an overlapping discussion, emphasizing the value of “policy mixes” in the
context of environmental law, see Gunningham and Grabosky, supra, at 422-448.

1. Mandate

2. Disclosure

3. Economic
incentive—
“tax”

Examples

Potential virtues

Potential problems

Fairness doctrine;
mandatory three hours
of childrens’
educational
programming; Clean
Air Act and Clean
Water Act
“technology”
approaches
Toxic Release
Inventory; warning
labels for foods and
drugs; television
ratings system
“green taxes”; polluters
pay

Effectiveness;
simplicity

Rigidity; high expense;
futility (if viewers fail to
watch,), even counterproductive (if producers
are able to circumvent
the system and to do
worse than they would
have done)

Flexibility, low
administrative
costs

Futility (if disclosure
does no good), a
particular problem in the
event of market failure

Some external monitoring by
private groups; well-suited to the
likely future

Efficiency and
hence a good
programming
“mix”; correction
of any market
failure and
serving
nonmarket goals

Difficulty of calculating
the relevant amount;
putting good
broadcasters at a
competitive disadvantage

Ability to calculate the tax along
with market failure or use of
nonmarket criteria; well-suited
to the short term at least

68

Most appropriate context and
overall evaluation
Three or four broadcasters and
no other television sources;
generally ill-suited to current
situation, except as “backstops”
against egregious behavior

4. Economic
incentive—
subsidy

Public Broadcasting
System; National
Endowment for the
Arts; “cash for
clunkers” in
environmental policy

Same as 3

5. Voluntary
selfregulation

Old National
Association of
Broadcasters Code;
Current” Responsible
Care” program for
chemical industry;
International
Standards
Organization
Ordinary commodities

Flexibility, use of
industry
knowledge, and
effectiveness;
creation of a kind
of “trustee
culture”

6. Market
ordering

Efficiency;
consumer
sovereignty

Difficulty of calculating
the subsidy; harmful
secondary effects, as in a
decrease in voluntay
provision of public
interest programming
(why play when you can
be paid?)
Lack of enforcement; a
charade designed to fend
off regulation; an effort
by some producers to
prevent competition
from others

Ability to calculate the subsidy
along with market failure or use
of nonmarket criteria; also wellsuited to the short term, in the
form of subsidies to PBS

Market failure, e.g.,
externalities, public good
problems; use of
noneconomic criteria,
e.g., democratic ideals

Brave new world (where
broadcasters have no special
role); perhaps appropriate,
probably alongside subsidies and
perhaps disclosure, in the very
long term
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External monitoring and/or
industry bona fides and/or threat
of mandates if this approach
fails; sensible until the
distinction crumbles between
broadcasters and others
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In the very long term, when broadcasters occupy no special role, it
may be best to impose disclosure requirements on general-interest
stations, and also to subsidize high-quality programming of various
sorts. It is too soon to know whether the very long-term will come in
the next decade or long thereafter.187
VIII. Conclusion
Dramatic changes in the emerging communications market do
not provide a sufficient reason to abandon the traditional goal of
ensuring a certain level of public interest programming. To some
extent this conclusion depends on conventional market failures. Thus
I have emphasized the external benefits that come from public
interest programming and also the peculiar characteristics of the
broadcasting market, where viewers, or eyeballs, are a commodity
provided to advertisers. To some extent this conclusion view turns on
a rejection of economic principles as the foundation for
communications policy. With respect to public interest
programming, viewers’ tastes may be a product of an undesirable set
of communications options, and in their capacity as citizens, they
may well want to make things better rather than worse. Especially in
light of the role of the communications media in the production of
culture—and hence both preferences and values—it is entirely
legitimate for a democratic government to refuse to make
“consumption choices” the exclusive basis for policy design. Thus I
have emphasized that a public committed to deliberative democracy
might support initiatives designed to provide better programming for
children and better coverage of public issues. This is so especially in
light of the fact that a significant minority of Americans lack cable or
other alternatives, and hence continue to depend on broadcasters for
television.
These points suggest that for the relevant future,188 public
interest standards deserve to play a large role. For the most part,
187

See Owen, supra, at 311-26 (predicting that convergence will take a long
time, with the suggestion that the Internet may never become an important
means of delivering television).
188 In the long-term, when broadcasters have little or no distinctive role, it may
be best to rely on government subsidies for high-quality broadcasting and on
disclosure requirements for general-interest programmers. See above.
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however, the policy instruments of choice should not involve rigid
dictates or commands, which are expensive and potentially
counterproductive, and in any case ill-suited to an era of rapidly
changing technology. Thus I have suggested a strong preference for
the less intrusive options of disclosure, economic incentives, and
voluntary self-regulation. Disclosure has been a surprisingly
successful, low-cost strategy in other areas of regulatory law. If
certain broadcasting is seen as a public good, analogous to clean air,
economic incentives may be able to accomplish a good deal, and to
do so at relatively low cost. Because competitive pressures are
frequently the engine behind poor broadcaster performance,
voluntary self-regulation may turn out to be a desirable kind of
“cartel,” helping to counteract short-term interests. Through this
route it may be possible to develop an intermediate system of
controls, responding to the market and non-market failures of
current markets, but without introducing the rigidity and
inefficiencies of command-and-control regulation.
If measures of this kind have promise in the areas of
environmental protection and public interest programming, there is
every reason to explore them in other, less familiar contexts as well.
In many areas of law, command-and-control regulation has proved a
partial or complete failure, and the natural alternative—a system of
well-defined property rights and freedom of contract—may produce
serious problems of its own. In such circumstances, any “third way,”
if it is ultimately to develop for the modern regulatory state, is likely
to place heavy reliance on disclosure, economic incentives, and
voluntary self-regulation.

